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The Milwaukee voucher program, as implemented in 1990, allowed only non-sectarian private
schools to participate in the program. Following a Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling, the program
saw a major shift and entered into its second phase, when religious private schools were allowed to
participate for the rst time in 1998. This led to more than a three-fold increase in the number
of private schools and almost a four-fold increase in the number of choice students. Moreover, due
to some changes in funding provisions, the revenue loss per student from vouchers increased in the
second phase of the program. This paper analyzes, both theoretically and empirically, the impacts
of these changes on public school performance in Milwaukee. It argues that voucher design matters
and that the choice of parameters in a voucher program is crucial as far as impacts on public school
incentives and performance are concerned. In the context of a theoretical model of public school
and household behavior, the paper establishes that the policy changes will lead to an improvement
of the public schools in the second phase of the program as compared to the rst phase. Following
Hoxby (2003a, 2003b) in treatment-control group classication, using data from 1987 to 2002, and
a dierence-in-dierences estimation strategy in trends, the paper then shows that the theoretical
prediction is validated empirically. This result is robust to alternative samples and specications,
and survive robustness checks including correcting for mean reversion.
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Widespread concerns over the performance of public schools have pushed the issue of public school
reform to the forefront of policy debate. The focus of public school reform has been on school choice and
accountability and vouchers are among the most hotly debated instruments of school choice. However,
not all voucher programs are alike. They often dier in structure and design and these dierences aect
public school incentives and responses dierently. Therefore, understanding the dierential eects of
alternative voucher programs is key to designing an eective voucher policy. This paper contributes
in this direction by studying, both theoretically and empirically, how changes in some crucial policy
parameters midway through the implementation of the Milwaukee voucher program aected public
school incentives and performance. It provides strong evidence that voucher design matters as far as
public school response is concerned.
The Milwaukee parental choice program (MPCP), as implemented in the 1990-91 school year, made
all public school households with income at or below 175% of the poverty line eligible for vouchers to
attend private schools. Initially only nonsectarian private schools were allowed to participate in the
program. The late 1990s saw two major shifts in the program: (i) Following the Wisconsin Supreme
Court ruling, religious schools participated for the rst time in the school year 1998-99. This led to a
massive increase in the number of private schools participating in the program and the number of public
school students lost to the program. (ii) Some changes in the state funding formula led to a discontinuous
increase in loss of revenue per student with vouchers starting from the school year 1999-2000.
This paper analyzes the eects of these shifts on the incentives and responses of the treated public
schools in Milwaukee. Specically, it compares the eect of the program after 1998 to that of the
initial 1990 program in terms of public school performance of the treated schools. I designate the
period before the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling (1990-91 through 1997-98) as the rst phase of the
Milwaukee program, and the period after the Supreme Court ruling (that is, 1998-99 onwards) as the
second phase of the Milwaukee program.
The paper develops its argument in the context of a formal theoretical model that is designed to
1capture the basic features of the Milwaukee voucher program. It has three agents: { the public school,
the households and the private schools. The demand for public school is endogenously determined from
household behavior, giving micro-foundations to the public school payo function. In an equilibrium
framework of public school and household behavior, the model endogenously determines public school
quality and its ingredients { public school eort and peer group quality. It yields an empirically testable
prediction|the treated public schools will exhibit unambiguously higher improvement in the second
phase of the program as compared to the rst phase.
Using school-level test score data from Wisconsin, the paper next proceeds to test the theoretical
prediction. Implementing a dierence-in-dierences estimation strategy in trends, it estimates the
program eects in each of the rst and second phases of the program by comparing the improvement of
the treated schools in each phase with an appropriate set of control schools. Controlling for potentially
confounding pre-program time trends and post-program common shocks, the paper nds considerable
evidence in favor of the theoretical prediction. This nding is robust to alternative strategies and
specications and continue to hold after controlling for other confounding factors such as mean reversion.
Moreover, it has strong policy implications.
The study of school vouchers has attracted considerable attention in the last decade. Nechyba
(1996, 1999, 2000) analyzes distributional eects of alternative voucher policies in a general equilibrium
framework that endogenizes residential choice. Epple and Romano (1998) argue that vouchers lead
to sorting by income and ability. They model private school and household behavior, but assume
public schools to be passive. Epple and Romano (2002) examine how alternative voucher designs can
aect stratication and technical eciency. They allow for public school technical ineciencies, but
these ineciencies are taken to be exogenous in their study. In particular, none of the above studies
endogenize public school quality.
Nechyba (2003) allows for eciency gain in the public schools facing competition from vouchers.1
However, he does not model public school behavior. Manski (1992) considers the impact of vouchers
1 He includes two constants in the public school production function that exogenously increase with a decrease in peer
quality variance and an increase in the share of private school attendance respectively.
2on public school expenditure and social mobility, while allowing for rent-seeking public schools. But
unlike the present paper, understanding the eect of changes of dierent policy parameters in a voucher
program on public school performance is not a concern in Manski. Modeling public school quality,
McMillan (2004) shows that under certain circumstances, public schools may nd it optimal to reduce
productivity when a voucher is introduced. The rst dierence once again is that the focus of this
paper is to analyze the impact of changes in alternative policy parameters in a voucher program on
public school performance,|this is not a concern in McMillan. This paper shows that even within
a traditional voucher program (the type considered by both Manski and McMillan), dierent choices
of parameters can have radically dierent eects on public school response. Second, while McMillan
employs a theoretical approach, this paper rst tries to understand the eect of the changes in policy
parameters in a theoretical context and then seeks to test the intuitions obtained there in an empirical
framework. Third, unlike McMillan, this paper models peer quality which is considered to be an essential
component of school quality. Fourth, it derives the demand for public school from equilibrium household
behavior, thus providing microfoundations to the public school payo function, unlike McMillan.
A number of empirical studies look at the eect of vouchers on the performance of students who move
to private schools with vouchers (the \choice students"). For a comprehensive review of this literature,
see Hoxby (2003b) and Rouse (1998). The empirical literature on the impact of vouchers on public
school performance in the U.S. has been relatively sparse. Greene (2001, 2003) nds positive eect of
the Florida program on the performance of treated schools. However, the classication into dierent
treatment groups in Greene (2003) is based on post-program grades of schools and hence is susceptible
to the endogeneity problem. Moreover, Greene (2003) uses a dierence-in-dierences analysis and takes
all other schools (other than the treatment group) as the control group. Since this comparison group
diers considerably from the treatment groups in terms of demographic characteristics, school scores
and grades, it is not clear how appropriate a control group it is. In response to Greene's (2001) paper, a
spurt of studies took place (Camilli and Bulkley (2001), Harris (2001), Kupermintz (2001)) that express
doubt that the program eect in the Greene study is contaminated by mean reversion2 and/or stigma
2 For a discussion of the mean reversion problem, see Chay et al. (2003).
3eect of getting the lowest performing grade \F". However, it is not clear that the above studies in
response to Greene were able to purge the program eect of mean reversion.3 Moreover, unlike the
present study, none of them control for any pre-program dierences in trend between treatment and
control schools which may bias the program eects.
By far the most substantial contribution to this still sparse literature is to be found in the important
studies by Hoxby (2003a, 2003b) on the Milwaukee voucher program. This study has been greatly
informed by the Hoxby studies. Hoxby (2003a) analyzes the impact of the Milwaukee voucher program
on public schools after the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling of 1998. She uses a novel strategy to pick
her treatment groups of schools. Since the MPS students eligible for free or reduced price lunches
were the ones eligible for vouchers (see footnote 29), the extent of treatment of the Milwaukee schools
depended on the percentages of their students eligible for free or reduced price lunches. Exploiting this,
she classies the Milwaukee schools into two treatment groups (\most treated" and \somewhat treated")
based on the percentages of their free or reduced price lunch students. Since all schools in Milwaukee are
potentially aected by the program, she chooses, as her control group, a set of schools within Wisconsin
but outside Milwaukee that are most similar to the Milwaukee schools. (Her treatment-control strategy
is discussed in more detail in section 6.1.1.) Using a dierence-in-dierences strategy, she nds a positive
productivity response to vouchers. Hoxby (2003b) controls for pre-program dierences in trends (unlike
Hoxby (2003a)), analyzes post-program data up to 20024 (unlike 2000 in Hoxby (2003a)) and using the
same treatment-control classication, nds evidence of a positive productivity response to vouchers in
Milwaukee after the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling.
3 In his study, Greene (2001) argues that mean reversion is not a problem as the gains achieved by low scoring F
schools are similar to those of the high scoring F schools between 1999 and 2000. However, similar gains of low scoring
and high scoring F schools do not imply an absence of mean reversion since 2000 is a post-program year. In fact, even in
the presence of mean reversion, the coecients of the high scoring and low scoring F schools can be similar if there are
dierential program eects between these two groups. The studies in response to Greene (2001) seek to arrive at mean
reversion corrected program eect by subtracting the post-program (2000) score from the predicted score in 2000, where
the predicted score is obtained from a regression of the 2000 score on the pre-program (1999) score. However, in this
strategy, the mean reversion eect is confounded with the program eect (since 2000 is a post-program year) and the mean
reversion correction gets rid of at least part of the program eect. (Harris (2001) and Kupermintz (2001) exclude the F
schools in their predicted score regressions. However, it is not clear that any mean reversion eect from the other groups
of schools can be attributed to the F schools.)
4 For the remainder of the paper, I will refer to school years by the calendar year of the spring semester.
4This paper follows Hoxby in the treatment-control group classication. As in Hoxby, it uses the
percentage of free or reduced price lunch eligible students in the Milwaukee public schools to classify
them into dierent treatment groups. The control group criteria is also based on Hoxby. While it uses
and builds upon Hoxby's contribution, it diers from Hoxby (2003a, 2003b) in several important ways.
First, the basic question posed is dierent. The focus of this paper is on voucher design. It is interested in
analyzing the eects of changes in some policy parameters,|more specically, in investigating whether
a voucher program that is characterized by a higher private school participation and higher public
school revenue loss per student is able to induce a higher public school performance. Therefore, unlike
Hoxby, it compares the eect of the Milwaukee program on public school performance in the second
phase with that in the rst phase. Second, this study employs two alternative methods of sample
formation. Following Hoxby, this study classies Milwaukee schools into dierent treatment groups
based on the percentages of their students eligible for free or reduced price lunches. However, this study
classies the Milwaukee schools into three treatment groups (unlike two in Hoxby) so that, on the one
hand, the treatment groups are more homogenous while on the other they are starker from each other.
Moreover, to test the robustness of the results, it also considers dierent samples that are constructed
by varying the cutos that divide the Milwaukee schools into dierent treatment groups. I follow Hoxby
in the control group classication also, although there are dierences as outlined in section 6.1.1. One
disadvantage of the above treatment group strategy is that it constrains the program eect to be the
same for all schools within a treatment group, that is, it does not allow within group dierences in
treatment intensities to aect performance. Therefore I also consider an alternative strategy. This
second strategy uses a continuous treatment variable where the intensity of treatment is proxied by the
schools' percentage of free or reduced price lunch eligible students in 1990.5
Third, unlike Hoxby, the current study controls for the potentially confounding factor, mean rever-
sion. Since the more treated schools were also the lowest scoring schools both before the program (1990)
and before the program shift (1998), a potential concern is that any improvement of the schools may
5 However, a disadvantage of this strategy is that it assumes that the program eect varies linearly with treatment
intensity. To address this problem, I also estimate alternative specications that alow for nonlinearities in the above
relationship. These are discussed in detail in section 6.1.
5be due to regression to the mean rather than a program eect. Fourth, while the graphical analysis in
Hoxby (2003b) looks at the eect of the reform for the dierent years during 1999-2002, the more precise
regression analysis looks at the average annual eect of the program (upto 2002 in Hoxby (2003b) and
2000 in Hoxby (2003a)). This paper analyzes the gains of the dierent treated groups in each of the
years separately, after the program shift as well as after the initial program. This is instructive since the
public school response may vary across the dierent years after the program. Fifth, unlike Hoxby, this
study controls for the possibility that changes in student composition of schools may bias the estimated
eects of voucher competition.
Sixth, unlike Hoxby, this study also investigates whether the potential competition faced by the
Milwaukee schools was actually eective. The Milwaukee schools, especially the more treated ones,
had a substantial proportion of their students eligible for vouchers. But this competition would not
be functional if there were not enough private schools surrounding them. To investigate the extent of
eective competition, I investigate the distribution of choice schools around Milwaukee public schools
and also the extent of their actual loss of students to the program. Finally, an important dierence with
Hoxby as well as the other studies mentioned above is that in addition to an empirical part, this paper
contains a theoretical part that is designed to capture the basic features of the Milwaukee program. It
aims to get an intuition into the nature of incentives created by the program shifts and seeks to analyze
their eects on public school performance. The empirical part seeks to test the theoretical predictions.
Although there are multiple papers that analyze the eects of alternative voucher policies on strati-
cation, distribution and welfare6, there is only one paper so far that looks at the impact of alternative
voucher designs on public school performance. Focusing on two publicly funded voucher programs in the
U.S.|Florida and Milwaukee|Chakrabarti (2004) shows, both theoretically and empirically, that dif-
ferences in designs in these two programs have led to very dierent eects on public school performance
in these two places. Specically, it shows that the \threat of voucher" design in the former has led to a
much higher improvement of the treated public schools than the traditional vouchers in the latter. The
6 Nechyba (2000) and Caucutt (2002) examine distributional and welfare consequences of targeting vouchers to low
income types; Epple and Romano (2002) and Hoxby (2001) consider the eect of alternative voucher policies on stratication
and equity. These papers relate to voucher design, but their concern is not its impact on public school performance.
6present study complements this paper in the sense that it shows that changes in some crucial policy
parameters even within the same traditional voucher program can have markedly dierent eects on
public school incentives and performance.
2 Institutional Background|The Program and its Shifts
The Milwaukee parental choice program (MPCP) was implemented in the 1990-91 school year in the city
of Milwaukee. It made all Milwaukee Public School (MPS) students in grades kindergarten through
twelve (K-12) with household income at or below 175% of the poverty line eligible for vouchers to
attend private schools. Initially, it allowed only nonsectarian private schools to participate and student
participation in the MPCP was limited to 1% of the MPS membership.7 The 1993 Wisconsin Act 16
raised the 1% limit to 1.5% which was further raised to 15% in 1996-97 under the 1995 Act 27.
The 1995 Act 27 also proposed that private sectarian or religious schools be allowed to participate
in the program. But this change was immediately challenged in court and a preliminary injunction
prohibiting this change was issued. On June 10, 1998, in a landmark decision (Jackson v. Benson),
the Wisconsin Supreme court ruled 4-2 that including religious schools in choice is constitutional. The
decision became even more important when on November 9, 1998, the U.S. Supreme court declined
(by an 8-to-1 vote), without comment, to review the case, ensuring that the ruling would stand in the
foreseeable future. Following the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling, the religious schools participated in
the program for the rst time in the 1998-99 school year.
In spite of the cap on MPCP enrollment, as mentioned above, this participation constraint was not
binding. As table 1 shows, the number of applicants was almost always considerably less than that
allowed by the program during the years 1990-91 through 1994-95. The picture has been very similar
after 1994-95. However program growth was limited by the capacity of the participating private schools.
The number of private school seats was a binding constraint|as table 1 shows, the number of private
school seats were not only well below the number authorized by the statute but were also considerably
7 Membership is the number of pupils enrolled in the school who are counted for the purpose of computing state general
equalization aids. It is based on an average of two counts in the regular school year (September and February) plus a full
time equivalency for summer school.
7less than the number of applicants in each of the years 1990-91 through 1994-95.
Therefore 1998 constitutes a benchmark year in the history of the MPCP. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court ruling of 1998 allowed religious schools to participate in the program thus relaxing the binding
constraint of the number of private school seats that limited the growth of the program. Table 2 shows
the membership and payment history of the MPCP and illustrates some of the immediate eects of
the ruling. As a consequence of the ruling, the number of private schools participating in the program
jumped 3.6 fold from 23 to 83 and the number of students enrolled in the MPCP increased almost four
fold from 1497 to 5761. Interestingly, as table 2 shows the MPS membership fell for the rst time in
the 1998-99 school year.
The nancing of the MPCP has also changed over the years. Under the MPCP, as implemented in
the 1990-91 school year, state aid would follow the pupil from the MPS to the private school. Pupils
participating in the choice program were then included in the membership count for MPS on a prior
year basis even though the pupils were attending private schools under the MPCP. This membership
count was then used to calculate the state aid for the district. The voucher amount equaled the state
aid per pupil8 and the MPCP was funded by reducing the state aid for the MPS district by the voucher
amount times the number of students attending under the MPCP.
The 1998 Act 9 made a number of changes with respect to the funding of the program which were
implemented in the 1999-2000 school year. The denition of membership was changed to exclude MPCP
pupils|unlike earlier, starting from the 1999-2000 school year, the MPCP pupils were no longer included
in the membership count of the MPS for state aid purposes. Moreover, the distribution of the burden
of nancing of the MPCP was changed. From the 1999-2000 school year, the amount needed to nance
the MPCP was funded 50% from a reduction of state aid to the MPS and 50% from a reduction in state
aid to the other 425 public school districts in the state. Under 2001 Act 16, which was implemented
in the 2001-02 school year, the MPCP was funded 45% from a reduction in state aid to MPS and 55%
from the state general purpose revenue, so that the other districts did not bear the burden of nancing
of the MPCP.
8 More precisely, it was the equalization aid per member.
8Although only 50% of the MPCP expenditure (45% from 2001-02) came from the MPS from 1999-
2000, the eective loss per student to the MPS was much more in the period since 1999-2000 than
before. This was because the membership count of the MPS for state aid purposes no longer included
the MPCP pupils, unlike earlier. If v denotes the voucher amount, the loss per student to the MPS in
the period prior to Act 9 was v, while the loss per student was at least (v + v
2) from 1999-2000.9
Table 2 also shows the voucher amount, the total MPCP amount and the distribution of the MPCP
burden among the MPS and other districts. Note that the relaxation of the private school participation
constraint in the 1998-99 school year led to a massive increase in the MPCP amount and a consequent
reduction in state aid to the MPS. The MPCP amount increased four fold from 7 million in 1998-99 to
28.7 million in 1999-2000 which was funded entirely by a corresponding reduction in state aid to the
MPS. The MPCP amount continued to increase due to the increase in the number of choice students,
but the 50% ( and latter 45%) funding rule reduced the MPS funding of the MPCP amount. However,
it should be noted that this table does not take into account the fact that the membership formula for
state aid no longer included the MPCP pupils, (so that the eective loss from 1999-2000 was much more
than illustrated here)|the table only illustrates the distribution of the MPCP burden.10
This paper analyzes the impact of the two major changes in the program described above on public
school performance|the discontinuous increase in private school participation from 1998-99 following
the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling and the discrete increase in the loss of revenue per student from
1999-2000 when the Act 9 changes in funding were implemented. Note that the 1998-99 year eect
would capture the eect of an increased private school participation, while the eect from 1999-2000
onwards would capture the eect of both an increased private school participation and an increase in
per pupil loss in revenue due to vouchers.
9 This changed to (v + 0:45v) from 2001-02.
10 Also note that the voucher amount was larger in the second phase than in the rst. This would reinforce the above
larger loss in revenue per pupil in the second phase.
93 The Model
There are three agents in the model: (i) the public school, (ii) the private schools, and (iii) the house-
holds. The public school is free and oers quality (q) to all households that choose to attend it. The
quality q is a composite of two factors: public school eort and public school peer-group quality. The
objective of the public school is to maximize net revenue, which I call \rent" in rest of the paper. I
adhere to the general line of thought in the school competition literature [Hoxby (2003a), Manski (1992),
McMillan (2004)] that the public school maximizes surplus or net revenue.11 Rent is simply dened as
revenue minus costs. Public school cost is given by: Cp(N;e) = c1 + c(N) + C(e), where c1 is a xed
cost, N is the number of students in public school and e is public school eort. Both c(:) and C(:)
functions are assumed to be increasing and strictly convex in their respective arguments. Per pupil
revenue is denoted by p and is exogenously given. Revenue depends on per pupil revenue, number of
students and in the presence of vouchers also on the loss of revenue per student lost due to vouchers.
(It is discussed in more detail in section 4.2.) In the absence of vouchers, it is simply given by p:N.
There is a continuum of private schools providing a continuum of quality levels. Each private school
is \passive" and does not take any maximizing decision.12 Households pay a tuition T = t  Q (t > 0)
to attend a private school of quality Q.
Households are characterized by an income-ability tuple (y;), where y 2 [0;1] and  2 [0;1]; y and
 are assumed to be independently and uniformly distributed. A household obtains utility (U) from
the consumption of the numeraire good (x), school quality () and its ability (). The household utility
function is assumed to be continuous and twice dierentiable and is given by U(x;;) = h(x)+u().
To simplify analysis, I assume hxx = 0. The function u is increasing and strictly concave in . It follows
that households with higher ability have a higher preference (marginal valuation) for school quality,
U > 0.
11 An alternative formulation could be to model the public school as a quality maximizer. However, in that case there
would be no argument for voucher programs as far as improving public school quality is concerned.
12 This is in keeping with the feature of the U.S. voucher experiments, by which private schools are not allowed to
discriminate between students. They have to accept all students unless oversubscribed and have to accept students
randomly when oversubscribed. (Of course, in the voucher experiments, they can choose whether or not to enter. I
abstract from that here for simplicity.)
10School qualities available to a household are public school quality and a continuum of (exogenously
given) private school qualities. Public school quality q = q(e;b) is a continuous, twice dierentiable,
increasing and concave function of public school eort e 2 [emin;emax] and public school peer quality b.
Public school peer quality is dened as the mean ability of the public school student body.13 If a public
school household decides to switch to a private school with vouchers, it incurs a positive switching or
relocation cost c.14
The paper models two alternative scenarios: (i) a simple public-private system (PP) without vouch-
ers (the baseline), which can be thought of as the pre-program scenario; and (ii) a Milwaukee-type
voucher program. The simple public-private system consists of two stages. In the rst stage, the pub-
lic school chooses eort. In stage 2, households choose between schools after observing public school
eort.15 Peer-group quality and public school quality are simultaneously determined.
The Milwaukee program is analyzed in three stages. In the rst stage, the government announces
voucher v and a cuto (or target) income level yT. Only households with y  yT are eligible for vouchers.
In stage 2, facing the program, the public school chooses eort. In stage 3, households choose between
schools and incur switching costs if they transfer out of public school. Peer-group quality and public
school quality are simultaneously obtained.
The number of private school seats available for households applying with vouchers is limited. (It
is a binding constraint in the sense that the number of applicants exceed the number of seats.) Private
schools pick voucher students randomly so that a random sample of those that apply are selected,|
a certain proportion (say, ) of the applicants are accepted/successful and (1   ) proportion are
rejected/unsuccessful and return to the public school.
Each of the systems constitutes a game between two players: the public school and the households.
13 Public school quality can be thought of as being embodied in public school scores. The notion here is that public
school scores reect both public school eort and public school peer-group quality, which in turn depends on the abilities
of the public school students. In other words, both public school characteristics and student characteristics contribute to
school scores.
14 Switching schools may separate children from their friends and social circles, require them to adapt to new teachers
or new curriculum, create logistical or scheduling diculties, interfere with extracurricular activities etc. The switching
cost \c" captures these costs.
15 The general notion in both the systems is that households observe last year's scores and whether vouchers were given
and then choose between schools.
11Consider the Milwaukee-type voucher program. Public school households moving in stage 3 observe the
program and public school eort and decide whether or not to apply with vouchers. The public school
moving in stage 2 observes the program, correctly anticipates household behavior and makes its rent
maximizing eort choice. In stage 1 of the simple public-private system, the public school chooses its
rent maximizing eort after correctly anticipating household behavior. In stage 2, households choose
between schools after observing public school eort.
The public-private equilibrium is characterized by an eort-peer quality tuple (ePP;bPP), where (i)
ePP is an equilibrium of the stage 1 game, given bPP and (ii) bPP is an equilibrium of the stage 2 game,
given ePP. The voucher equilibrium is a peer-group quality bV and an eort eV such that given voucher
v, income cuto yT and proportion , (i) eV characterizes the public school equilibrium, given bV and
(ii) bV characterizes the household equilibrium, given eV .
4 Characterization of the program equilibria
This section rst solves for the household and public school equilibria. Next, it compares the public
school qualities under the PP and voucher equilibria. Finally, it analyzes the eect of relaxation of
the private school participation constraint and an increase in the revenue loss from vouchers on public
school quality in a voucher equilibrium, so as to compare the equilibrium quality under Milwaukee phase
I and phase II.
4.1 Household behavior
This subsection analyzes the household behavior under the two systems in a common framework. Each
household can either choose a public or a private school. It gets utility h(y)+u(q(e;b)) from a public
school and utility h(y + v   t  Q   c) + u(Q) from private, where Q is the optimal private school
quality choice of household (y;) given v, t and c. The parameter v takes on a value of zero under
the pre-program public-private system, and under the Milwaukee voucher system if the income of the
household exceeds yT. On the other hand, v takes on an exogenously given positive value under the
voucher program, for all households with y  yT. A household (y;) chooses private school i h(y+v 
12tQ c)+u(Q) > h(y)+u(q(e;b)).16 Dene D = [h(y+v tQ c)+u(Q)] [h(y)+u(q(e;b))].
Suppose all households expect a peer group quality be 2 [0;1]. 17 Then for each y and given t;v;e;c
and expected peer group quality be 2 [0;1], there exists a unique household 0 < ^  < 1 such that all
households with lower ability choose the public school and those with higher ability choose a private
school. This ^  is the unique solution to the equation:
[h(y + v   t:Q   c) + u(Q)]   [h(y) + u(q(e;be))] = 0 (3.1.1)
where Q is the optimal private school quality choice of the household (y; ^ (y)).18 Since the indirect util-
ity and the q functions are continuously dierentiable and D > 0, ^  = ^ (y;v;e;be;t;c) (3:1:1a)
can be obtained as a continuously dierentiable function of v, be, t, c, for each y.19 Using the implicit
function theorem it is straightforward to check that for each income level, the cuto ability level ^  is
decreasing in v and increasing in e, be, t and c.



























The numerator denotes the sum of abilities of all households attending public school. The denominator
denotes the total number of households attending public school. When v 6= 0, the rst term in each
of numerator and denominator corresponds to low income households who are eligible for vouchers
but choose public school; the last term corresponds to high income households who choose public
school; the middle term corresponds to the proportion of low income households who are unsuccessful
16 Note that this holds not only under the simple public-private system but also under the voucher system. Under
the voucher system, a household applying with vouchers knows that it will be accepted only with a positive probability
(less than one). However, if it prefers private to public, it prefers a lottery between private and public to public and still
continues to apply to private school. Formally a voucher eligible household chooses private school i [h(y + v   t  Q
  
c) + u(Q
)] + (1   )[h(y) + u(q(e;b))] > [h(y) + u(q(e;b))]) [h(y + v   t  Q
   c) + u(Q
)] > [h(y) + u(q(e;b))]
17 I assume that there are always some households in the public and some households in the private sector at each income
level. This assumption is made for simplicity. All results go through as long as there is at least one income for which this
assumption holds.
18 To save some notation the optimal private school quality choice of the corresponding household is always denoted by
Q
. It is obvious that the value of Q
 will change with income and ability.
19 Since hxx = 0, the income eect of school quality is zero. It follows that, given other parameters, in the voucher
system, the cuto ability level is independent of y in both the ranges [0;yT) and (yT;1], but there is a discontinuity at
yT. In the PP system, the cuto ability is independent of y in [0,1]. Moreover, although the household equilibrium is
characterized by stratication by ability (
D
 > 0), there is no stratication by income (
D
y = 0).
13in getting a voucher seat (in spite of application) and return to public school. Under the simple
public-private system, v = 0.20 At equilibrium, b corroborates the initial conjecture be, that is, b =
be: (3.1.3)
The household equilibrium is characterized by (3.1.1)-(3.1.3). If all households expect a peer-
group quality, then at equilibrium this expectation has to be fullled. Mathematically, given pa-
rameters e;v;t;c;yT;, a xed point in b is reached. It can be shown that a household equilib-
rium always exists.21 (See appendix for proof.) From (3.1.1)-(3.1.3), the equilibrium peer quality
satises the equation b = g(b;e;v;t;c;yT;). The corresponding equilibrium allocation of house-
holds between public and private sectors is characterized by ^ (y;b;:) for y 2 [0;1]. The num-













The equilibrium number of public school students increases with public school eort and decreases
with vouchers. (See appendix for proof.) The intuitive argument here is as follows. An increase in public
school eort leads to an inux of higher ability households at each income level, that is an increase in
the equilibrium cuto ability level ^ (y;b) at each income level. This occurs through two channels.
Given peer quality, an increase in e induces households just above the cuto at each income level to
switch to the public school. This increases peer quality, leading to a further inux of higher ability
households just above the cuto from the private to the public sector. These two eects working in the
same direction reinforce each other and lead to an increase in the total number of public school students
at equilibrium. Vouchers, acting directly, as well as indirectly through peer quality, induce a ight of
high ability households at each income level at and below yT to the private sector. The consequence is
a decrease in the total number of public school students with vouchers at a household equilibrium.
20 Note that under the voucher system the upper limit of the middle integral (in both numerator and denominator) is
given by the cuto ability at the pre-program public-private system, ^ 0(y), and is not dependent on any parameter change
in the voucher system. (Under the PP system, ^ (y;b
e;0;:) = ^ 0(y).)
21 However the equilibrium may not be unique. In the presence of multiple equilibria, one cannot be sure (without a well-
specied model of dynamics of adjustment) which equilibrium will be reached after a small perturbation of a parameter.
To avoid these diculties, I henceforth restrict my attention to parameter values that ensure unique equilibrium. A unique
equilibrium holds if b(0) > 0 and
g
be < 1. These conditions always hold if the marginal utility from quality (
u
q ) and the
marginal responsiveness of quality to peer quality (
q
be) are not very large.
14An increase in the proportion  leads to a decrease in the number of public school students at a
household equilibrium. This is because with an increase in , larger number of voucher applicants are
absorbed by private schools, thus decreasing the number of unsuccessful students returning to public
schools. However, the marginal number of students that the public school can gain with an increase in
eort increases with . (See appendix for proof.) Under the voucher system, only  proportion of those
that apply with vouchers are accepted, while (1 ) proportion return to public school. Therefore, with
a marginal increase in eort, out of the students who would like to return to public school, some are
already in public school due to previous failure to get a voucher seat,|so that the number of students
gained with a marginal increase in eort is smaller than if  was equal to one. If  is higher, higher
proportion of voucher applicants are accepted and less students return to public school unsuccessful.
Hence marginal number of students gained by a public school due to an increase in eort under higher
 is larger.
4.2 Public School Behavior
The public school correctly anticipates household behavior in the future stage of the corresponding
game, and chooses eort to maximize rent. Under the PP system, the revenue function is given by
pN(e;0) and the rent function is given by pN(e;0)   c1   c(N(e;0))   C(e).22 Correspondingly, there
exists a unique eort ePP that solves the rst order condition
R(e;0)
e = (p   cN)Ne(e;0)  Ce(e) = 0.23
Under phase I of the Milwaukee voucher system, the students participating in the choice program
were included in the membership count of the MPS for revenue purposes and then the MPCP amount
(obtained by multiplying the voucher amount times the number of MPCP participants) was subtracted
from the MPS revenue. The revenue function under phase I of the program is therefore given by:
pN(e;0)   v[N(e;0)   N(e;v)] = pN0   v[N0   N(e;v)], where N(e;0) = N0 gives the equilibrium
number of students under the pre-program public-private system. The corresponding rent function
is given by RV;I(:) = pN0   v[N0   N(e;v)]   c1   c(N(e;v))   C(e). In phase II, the denition of
22 Note that N depends on other parameters t;c;yT; also, but they are suppressed to simplify notation.
23 I assume juj is suciently high, that is, the rate of fall of marginal utility of quality with quality is suciently
large. This ensures that the revenue function is strictly concave under each of the three systems (PP, voucher phase I and
voucher phase II). Since the cost function is strictly convex, the rent function is strictly concave under this assumption.
15membership was changed to exclude MPCP pupils from the membership count of the MPS for revenue
purposes and only half the MPCP amount was funded from the MPS revenue. To incorporate this, the
revenue function is modeled as pN(e;v)   v
2[N0  N(e;v)] = pN0  p[N0  N(e;v)]   v
2[N0  N(e;v)] =
pN0  (p+ v
2)[N0  N(e;v)]. The corresponding rent function is given by RV;II(:) = pN0  (p+ v
2)[N0  
N(e;v)]  c1  c(N(e;v))  C(e). Since the voucher amount has been approximately equal to state aid
per pupil, p > v. Denoting the loss in revenue per student due to vouchers by l, the rent functions can
be denoted by:





v in Milwaukee Phase I
(p + v
2) in Milwaukee Phase II
Since (p + v
2) > v, l in phase II exceeds that in phase I.24 Let eV;I and eV;II denote the unique
equilibrium eorts under the phase I and phase II programs obtained by solving the corresponding rst
order conditions.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium public school eort under the voucher program can be either greater or less
than the pre-program public-private equilibrium.
In the pre-program simple public-private equilibrium, marginal revenue equals marginal cost of eort
at ePP. Vouchers aect both marginal revenue and marginal cost in multiple ways and these eects
together determine whether or not the public school increases eort. More precisely, equilibrium eort
increases i the following expression is positive: [(p cN)Nev   cNNNvNe] (3.2.1). Vouchers decrease
the number of public school students. Since the cost function is convex in the number of students,
vouchers decrease marginal cost on this account. This is captured by the second term in (3.2.1). The
rst term captures the change in net marginal revenue due to vouchers. Given that net marginal
revenue per student (p cN) is positive, this depends on the eect of vouchers on the marginal number
24 Even if the federal and local revenues do not go down with loss of pupils to MPCP, the loss of revenue per pupil
in the second phase will be at least (v +
v
2) > v. Formally, the revenue in the second phase can then be represented by:
pN0   (v +
v
2)[N0   N(e;v)] = [p   (v +
v
2)]N0 + (v +
v




16of students from a unit increase in eort (Nev). This can either increase or decrease with vouchers,
thus rendering the eect on public school eort ambiguous.25 Public school eort increases if either net
marginal revenue increases or the decrease in marginal revenue is less than the decrease in marginal
cost.
Proposition 2 (i) In a voucher program, an increase in the revenue loss per student due to vouchers,
l, increases equilibrium eort. (ii) In a voucher program, an increase in the proportion  increases
equilibrium eort.
The rst part of the proposition says that a higher revenue loss per student will lead to higher equilibrium
eort. Therefore equilibrium eort under phase II of the program will be greater than phase I on this
account. An increase in the revenue loss per student with vouchers implies that the revenue that can
be gained by attracting a student (who would have otherwise moved to private school with vouchers) to
public school is higher. A marginal increase in eort, given other parameters, attracts exactly the same
number of students in both phase I and phase II and hence leads to the same increase in cost. However
due to a higher l in phase II, the increase in revenue is greater in phase II. This induces public schools
to supply a higher eort at equilibrium in phase II.
The second part of the proposition says that a higher proportion  would lead to a higher equilibrium
eort. Therefore equilibrium eort under phase II of the program will be greater than phase I on this
account. Consider two voucher systems, the only dierence between them being a higher  in the second
voucher system. At equilibrium under the rst voucher system, marginal revenue of eort exactly equals
its marginal cost. Starting from this same eort in the second system, a marginal increase in eort
increases the cost of eort by exactly the same amount as in the rst system (Ce is same). However, as












dy. There are two eects. The rst is a direct eect whereby the marginal
number of students that the school can gain with a unit increase in eort falls with vouchers. Vouchers lead to an exodus
of relatively high-ability households (at each income level) to private schools, so that the new marginal household (who is
indierent between the public and private sectors) has a relatively lower marginal valuation of quality. Consequently, the
number of students gained due to a marginal increase in eort is lower under vouchers. This is captured by the negative
rst term. The second is an indirect eect. Vouchers decrease peer quality (
b
v < 0) which in turn aects the marginal
number of students. Since the marginal utility from school quality decreases with quality (uqq < 0) the marginal number
of students due to an increase in eort decreases with an increase in peer quality (
2 ^ (y;b;:)
eb < 0). Since vouchers lead to a
fall in peer quality, the marginal number of students increases due to this factor (which is captured by the positive second
term).
17larger,|this leads to a higher marginal revenue. Also, the number of public school students under the
second system is smaller, which given the convexity of cost in the number of students, leads to a lower
marginal cost. Therefore the public school nds it protable to supply a higher eort under the second
system. Using this result and the denition of quality and peer quality, the corollary below follows.
Corollary 1 Equilibrium eort and quality under Milwaukee Phase II will exceed those under Phase I.
5 Data
The data for this paper come from multiple sources and consist of school-level data on test scores,
socio-economic characteristics of schools, and school nances. They are obtained from the Wisconsin
Department of Public Instruction (DPI), the Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS), and the Common Core
of Data (CCD) of the National Center for Education Statistics. Data on socioeconomic characteristics
include data on race, sex and percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches for the
period 1987-2002 and are from the CCD and the MPS. Data on per pupil expenditure for the same
period are available from the Wisconsin DPI and the MPS.
For the rst phase, school-level data on test scores are available on two tests: (i) the Third Grade
Reading Test (renamed the Wisconsin Reading Comprehension Test (WRCT) in 1996) obtained from
the Wisconsin DPI and (ii) the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) obtained from the MPS. The WRCT
is a state-administered grade 3 reading test that has been administered since 1989. From 1989 through
1997, school scores for this test were reported in three \performance standard categories": percentage
of students below, percentage of students at, and percentage of students above the standard.26 School
scores for these three categories are available for 1989-97. The ITBS reading, math and language arts
tests were district administered tests and data on grade 5 ITBS reading, math and language arts scores
are available for the periods 1987-93, 1987-97 and 1989-92 respectively. The ITBS language arts test
was last administered in 1992. Starting with 1994, the ITBS was administered only in math; as of 1999,
the ITBS was no longer administered as a district assessment program. The mode of reporting ITBS
26 Percentage of students below the performance standard, percentage of students at the standard, and percentage of
students above the standard will be denoted by % above, % at, and % below, respectively, in the remainder of the paper.
18math scores changed in 1998. So I focus on pre-1998 ITBS math scores.
For the second phase, school level data are available on the Wisconsin Knowledge and Concepts
Examination (WKCE) from the DPI. WKCE is a statewide examination administered in grades 4, 8
and 10 annually in the subject areas of reading, language arts, math, science and social studies. The
rst administration of WKCE in grade 4 took place in 1997.27 School level grade 4 NPR scores on the
ve subject areas are available for the period 1997-2002.28
6 Empirical Strategy
The empirical part of the paper seeks to test the theoretical prediction that the quality improvement of
the treated public schools in the Milwaukee voucher program will be greater in the second phase than
in the rst phase.
6.1 Samples and Specications
6.1.1 Samples
I employ two alternative strategies for sample formation. Both strategies use the basic intuition in
the Hoxby studies that the extent of treatment of the Milwaukee public schools depends on their pre-
program percentages of free or reduced price lunch eligible students.
First Strategy: This strategy is based on Hoxby (2003a) and is similar to hers. Since the free or
reduced price lunch eligible students of the MPS were the ones eligible for vouchers, the extent of
treatment of the Milwaukee schools depended on the percentages of their students eligible for free or
27 In grades 8 and 10, WKCE was rst administered in 1994.
28 School scores on the WRCT are available for the second phase also. However, according to the Wisconsin DPI, the
test results for 1998 and afterwards are not comparable to those in 1997 and before. The original performance standard
for WRCT was established in 1989 and scores were identied into three categories based on one standard: percentage of
students above, below and at standard or inconclusive. The \inconclusive" category represented a margin of error around
the cut score where the scores were neither clearly above or below standard. In 1998, reporting requirements were changed
to four reporting categories: minimal, basic, procient and advanced. A new panel established new performance standards
in 1998. This time three standards instead of one was used. The test format was also changed, more challenging items were
included and the number of test items on the test was increased. Because of these signicant changes, the DPI maintains
that the pre-1998 test scores are not comparable to those at or after 1998. So comparable data for WRCT are available
for the second phase only for 1998-2002. Since this makes controlling for pre-program dierences in trend impossible (due
to availability of only one year of pre-program data), I have not used WRCT scores for my analysis in the second phase.
19reduced price lunches.29 Exploiting this, Hoxby classies the Milwaukee schools into two treatment
groups based on the percentages of their free or reduced price lunch students|\most treated" (Milwau-
kee schools where at least two-thirds of the students were eligible for free or reduced price lunches in
the pre-program period) and \somewhat treated" (Milwaukee schools where less than two-thirds of the
students were eligible for free or reduced price lunches in the pre-program period).
I classify the schools into three treatment groups (unlike two in Hoxby) based on their pre-program
(1989-90 school year) percentages of free or reduced price lunches. So the treatment groups here are
more homogenous as well as starker from each other. Also, as will be discussed below, to test the
robustness of the results, I consider alternative samples that are obtained by varying the cutos that
separate the dierent treatment groups.
I restrict my analysis to elementary schools only, as is Hoxby. First, as table 5 shows, most of
the students participating in the MPCP were elementary grade students. This may be because the
private elementary schools were less costly than private high schools (Hoxby (2003a)) and/or bulk of
the participating MPCP schools oered programs in elementary grades (Wisconsin Legislative Audit
Bureau Reports (1995, 2000)). Second, there were very few middle and high schools in the MPS, so
that the number of schools in the dierent treatment groups would be too small to justify analysis.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of Milwaukee elementary public schools according to the percentages
of their free or reduced-price lunch eligible students in 1990. Since schools with such population between
47% and 60% clearly form a group with an appreciable number of schools, they constitute my middle
or somewhat treated group. Schools with at least 60% of their students eligible for free or reduced-price
lunch are classied as \more treated" and those below 47% as \less treated". I shall denote this sample
as \60-47". It consists of 42 more treated, 42 somewhat treated, and 21 less treated schools. In the
more treated group an average of 82.9% of students were eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, 62.9%
were black and 14.81% were hispanic. In the somewhat treated group an average of 53.6% were free or
29 Under the Milwaukee program, all households at or below 175% of the poverty line are eligible to apply for vouchers.
Households at or below 185% of the poverty line are eligible for free or reduced-price lunches. However the cuto of 175%
is not strictly enforced (Hoxby (2003b)) and households within this 10% margin are often allowed to apply. Also there were
very few students who fell in the 175%-185% range, in fact 90% of the free/reduced price lunch eligible students qualied
for free lunch. (Witte (2000)). Students below 135% of the poverty line qualify for free-lunch.
20reduced-price lunch eligible, 50.57% were black and 3.68% were hispanic. In the less treated group an
average of 37.17% were free or reduced-price lunch eligible, 45.37% were black and 3.83% were hispanic.
Since it may be interesting to consider a classication where the middle (somewhat treated) group
contains the mean30 and some schools above and below the mean, I construct a second sample, the \66-
47" sample.31 To test the robustness of the results, I also consider alternative classications, such as \66"
and \60" samples, wherein schools with at least a 66% (60%) free or reduced-price lunch population are
designated as more treated schools, and schools with free or reduced-price lunch population below 66%
(60%) are designated as somewhat treated schools. (Note that the 66 sample corresponds to Hoxby's
classication and my more treated group in the 66-47 sample corresponds to Hoxby's most treated
group.) Apart from these samples, I have also experimented with other samples such as 75-47, 75, and
50 samples which are dened similarly. The results for these samples are broadly similar to the above
four and hence will not be reported here.
The control group criteria used here is based on Hoxby (2003a). Since all schools in Milwaukee were
potentially aected by the program, she constructs a control group that consists of Wisconsin schools
outside Milwaukee that satisfy the following criteria: (i) they were urban (ii) had at least 25% of their
population eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, and (iii) had black students compose at least 15% of
the school population. Her control group consists of 12 schools.
I follow Hoxby in my control group classication, although there is some dierence. The 1989-90
Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Data Set of the NCES Common Core of Data classies
schools into seven locales (1-7) according to their locations. All Milwaukee schools fall in either of two
categories|1 (large central city) and 3 (urban fringe of large central city). I picked elementary schools
outside Milwaukee but within Wisconsin that in 1989-90 had at least 25% of their students eligible for
free or reduced price lunches, had black students constitute at least 15% of their school population and
30 The mean percentage of free or reduced-price lunch students in the Milwaukee Public Schools in 1990 was 59%.
31 Here schools with a free or reduced-price lunch population between 47% and 66% form the somewhat treated group;
those with at least 66% such population form the more treated group; those below 47% form the less treated group. It
contains 33 more treated, 53 somewhat treated and 21 less treated schools. Under this classication, the more treated
group has an average of 84.5% free or reduced-price lunch eligible students, 66.5% black, and 18.07% hispanic students.
The somewhat treated group has an average of 55.4% free or reduced-price lunch eligible students, 50.99% black, and
4.09% hispanic students.
21were as similar as possible to the Milwaukee schools in terms of their locales to form my control group.
No elementary school outside Milwaukee (but within Wisconsin) had a locale code of 1. Therefore I
picked elementary schools that satised the above two criteria in terms of their black and free/reduced
price lunch populations and had a locale code of 2 (middle-size central city), 3 or 4 (urban fringe of
mid-size city). The control group thus constructed contained 33 schools. Most of these schools had
a locale code of 2 and very few had codes 3 and 4. These schools come from four school districts|
Beloit, Kenosha, Madison Metropolitan and Racine. Geographically also, they are located close to
Milwaukee.32 In this untreated comparison group, an average of 44.95% of the students were eligible
for free or reduced-price lunches, 22.37% were black, and 14.84% were hispanic. This group forms the
control group for each of the above samples of treated schools. The groups thus constructed will form
my treatment and control groups for the rst phase as well as the second phase of the program, that
is, the schools in the dierent treatment and control groups remain exactly the same in the analyses
of the rst and second phases. Using each of these samples, I investigate how the dierent treatment
groups in Milwaukee responded to the voucher program in the rst phase and in the second phase of
the program in comparison to the control group of schools.
Second Strategy: A disadvantage of the above strategy is that it constrains the program eect to be
the same for all schools within a treatment group. Therefore, an alternative way to assess the impact of
the program is to consider a continuous treatment variable. Here the intensity of treatment of schools
is proxied by the percentage of their students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches in 1990 (%frl).
Still another advantage of this strategy is that it obviates the necessity of the assignment of cutos,
whose locations may to some extent be debatable.
There is a wide variation across Milwaukee schools in the percentage of their free or reduced-price
lunch students. In 1990, some schools had as few as 22% of their students eligible for free or reduced-
price lunches, while others had as large as 93% of their students eligible. Exploiting this variation, I
investigate whether an increase in the intensity of treatment is associated with higher improvement in
32 Milwaukee, Kenosha and Racine are located in CESA 1 (Cooperative Educational Service Agency). Beloit and
Madison are located in CESA 2 which borders CESA 1. The state of Wisconsin is organized into 12 CESAs.
22each of the rst and second phases of the program and how the improvement (if any) compares between
the two phases.
6.1.2 Specications
This study considers public school scores as the outcome variable. The initial program was announced
in 1990 and was rst implemented in the 1990-91 school year. As outlined earlier, the program saw
a major shift in 1998 which took eect in the 1998-99 school year. The 1990 and 1998 programs can
be looked upon as two separate programs, more so because the shift took place eight years after the
initial program. (In spite of that, the regressions investigating the second phase improvement control
for pre-program trends, so that any long term eects of the initial program are dierenced out.)
First consider the estimation strategy corresponding to the treatment-control group classication.
The identifying assumption in the analysis of both phases is that if the dierent treatment and control
groups have similar trends in the corresponding pre-program period, any shift of the treated groups
in comparison to the control group in the post-program period can be attributed to the program. To
test the identifying assumption, I rst run the following xed eects regression (and also the OLS
counterpart of it) using only pre-reform or pre-program data. Pre-program data for the rst phase span
1987-90 while those for the second phase span 1997-98.
sit = fi + 0t + 1;MT(MT  t) + 1;ST(ST  t) + 1;LT(LT  t) + Xit + it
where sit is ith school score in year t, fi are school xed eects, t denotes time trend, MT is a dummy
variable taking a value of 1 for more treated schools and 0 otherwise, ST is a dummy variable taking
a value of 1 for somewhat treated schools and 0 otherwise, LT is a dummy variable taking a value of 1
for less treated schools and 0 otherwise, (MT  t), (ST  t) and (LT  t) are interactions between trend
and MT, ST and LT respectively, Xit denotes the set of school characteristics and it is a stochastic
error term. 1;MT, 1;ST and 1;LT capture the pre-program dierences in trend of the MT, ST and LT
schools in comparison to the control schools.33
33 When there are data on more than two pre-program years (as in the case of ITBS reading and Math in the rst
phase) I also t a non-linear specication with pre-program year dummies and interactions of the treated dummies with
23If the treated and control groups have the same pre-program trend, I use the following set of
specications to investigate whether the treated groups demonstrate a higher improvement in test
scores compared to the control group in the post-program era. If the treated groups demonstrate a
dierential pre-program trend, in addition to estimating these specications, I also estimate slightly
modied versions of them where I control for their pre-program dierences in trends. I begin with a
completely linear model:
sit = fi + 0t + 1v +
X
I
2I(I  v) + 3(v  t) +
X
I
4I(I  v  t) + 5Xit + it; where I = fMT;ST;LTg
(1)
Here v is the program dummy, v = 1 if year > 1998 and 0 otherwise. The specications shown here
are for the second phase. The rst phase specications are the same except that the years are dierent.
(For example, for the rst phase, v = 1 if year > 1990 and 0 otherwise.) The variables v and v  t
respectively control for post-program common intercept and trend shifts such as national, state and
county level shifts. The coecients on the interaction terms (I  v) and (I  v  t), I = fMT;ST;LTg
estimate the program eects|2;I, capture the intercept shifts and 4;I the trend shifts for the MT,
ST and LT schools respectively compared to the control group of schools. Note that one would expect
the eects to have a strict hierarchy|MT eects should exceed the corresponding ST eects and the
ST eects the corresponding LT eects. All specications I describe here are xed eects regressions.
I also estimate OLS counterparts of each of these specications. All OLS regressions include dummies
for the dierent treatment groups.
The second model allows the trend in the comparison group to be non-linear while still constraining
the year-to-year gains of the treated schools in the post-program period to be linear in addition to an
intercept shift.






0I(I  v) +
X
I
1I(I  v  t) + 2Xit + it; where I = fMT;ST;LTg (2)
where Di, i = f1998;::;2002g are year dummies for 1998 through 2002 respectively. 0I and 1I,
pre-program year dummies. This allows the individual pre-program year eects of the treated schools to vary in an
unrestricted way from those of the control schools.
24I = fMT;ST;LTg reect the post-program intercept and trend shifts respectively of the MT, ST and
LT groups after controlling for common post-program year eects.
Finally, I estimate a completely unrestricted and non-linear model that includes year dummies to
control for common year eects and interactions of post-program year dummies with the MT, ST and
LT dummies respectively to capture individual post-program year eects.






0i(MT  Di) +
2002 X
i=1998
1i(ST  Di) +
2002 X
i=1998
2i(LT  Di) + 3Xit + it
(3)
This specication no longer constrains the post-program year-to-year gains to be equal and allows the
program eect to vary across the dierent years. The coecients 0I 1I and 2I, I = f1998;::;2002g
represent respectively the more treated, somewhat treated and less treated year eects after one, two,
three and four years into the program.
Now consider the estimation strategy corresponding to the continuous variable formulation. For
each of the two phases, I estimate versions of the above three regressions after appropriately adjusting
them for a continuous variable:
sit = fi + 0t + 1v + 2(%frl  v) + 3(v  t) + 4(%frl  v  t) + 5Xit + it
sit = fi +
2002 X
i=1998
iDi + 0(%frl  v) + 1(%frl  v  t) + 3Xit + it






 1;i(%frl  Di) +  3Xit + it
The corresponding OLS regressions also include the variable %frl. The linear and semi-linear spec-
ications investigate whether intercept or trend shifts are associated with an increment of treatment
intensity, while the non-linear specication investigates whether an increment in treatment intensity is
associated with year eects in the rst, second, third and fourth years after program. It may be noted
here that, in this approach, the program eect is assumed to vary linearly with treatment intensity. To
relax this assumption, I also estimate modied versions of the above specications. The linear speci-
cation then includes interactions between treatment intensity, dummy variables representing dierent
treatment groups and program dummy (%frl  I  v where I = fMT;ST;LTg) and interactions be-
tween treatment intensity, treatment group dummy variables, program dummy and trend (%frlIvt
25where I = fMT;ST;LTg). The non-linear specication includes interactions between treatment inten-
sity, group dummy variables and year dummies(%frlI Di). The treatment groups used here are the
more treated, somewhat treated and less treated groups described above. (Here, I consider treatment
group classication corresponding to each of the samples above.)
6.2 Mean Reversion
However, there are several concerns that are worth considering. I discuss these and their potential
concerns one by one. First is the issue of mean reversion. Mean reversion is the statistical tendency
whereby high or low scoring schools tend to score closer to the mean subsequently. The more treated
schools were among the lowest scoring schools in each of the subject areas in both 1990 and 1998|
in particular, the more treated average scores in each of the subject areas were lower than each of
the corresponding somewhat treated, less treated and control school average scores, and in many cases,
these dierences were statistically signicant. Therefore, a natural question to ask would be whether the
improvement (if any) in the Milwaukee program is driven by mean reversion rather than the program.
Since I do a dierence-in-dierences analysis, my estimates would be contaminated if the more treated
schools exhibit mean reversion in comparison to the control group of schools. Note that mean reversion
can be a problem in the estimation corresponding to the treatment-control group strategy only, but not
corresponding to the continuous variable estimation strategy.
To address the issue of mean reversion, I use the pre-program data for the corresponding phase. To
investigate the issue of mean reversion in the second phase, I examine whether schools, that before the
program shift, were similarly low scoring as the more treated schools in 1998 improved relative to the
control schools before the program shift. If they did, then this shift can be attributed to mean reversion
as this was before the program shift. To implement this strategy, I use two alternative methods. In
method 1, I rst construct an index which is the sum of NPR scores in the ve subjects of reading,
language arts, math, science and social studies. Based on this index, I rank the Milwaukee schools in
1998 and note the ranks of each of the more treated, somewhat treated and less treated schools. Then
using 1997 WKCE scores, I rank the schools in terms of this index in 1997. Using the 1997 ranks, I pick
26schools in 1997 that have exactly the same ranks as the more treated schools in 1998. I call this group
of schools, the \low" group. Similarly, using the ranks of the somewhat treated (less treated) schools
in 1998, I pick schools in 1997 that have the same rank as the 1998 somewhat treated (less treated)
schools, and call them the \mid" (\high") schools. The intuition here is that any improvement of the
\low" schools in comparison to the control schools34 during the period 1997-98 can be characterized
as the mean reversion eect of the more treated schools as this was before the program shift. I then
subtract out this mean reversion eect from the program eect of more treated schools in phase II to
arrive at the mean reversion corrected eect.
In method 2, I rank the Milwaukee schools in 1998 on the basis of NPR scores of each subject, and
calculate the mean reversion eect of each subject solely based on ranks of schools in that subject. For
example, ranking schools in 1998 in terms of NPR reading scores, I note the ranks of the more treated,
somewhat treated and less treated schools. Then I rank the schools in 1997 based on their 1997 WKCE
reading NPR scores and pick schools that have the same rank as the more treated in 1998 and call then
the \low" group. Similarly, I construct the \mid" and \high" groups in 1997. If the \low" group thus
constructed exhibit an improvement relative to the control schools in reading during 1997-98, I call this
the mean reversion eect in reading and subtract it out from the more treated program eect in reading
obtained earlier to arrive at the mean reversion corrected eect in reading. Similarly, based on ranks of
schools in each of the other subjects in 1997 and 1998, I calculate the mean reversion corrected eect
in the corresponding subjects. To investigate the issue of mean reversion in phase I, I use exactly the
same two methods as above except that the years 1997 and 1998 are respectively replaced by 1989 and
1990 and schools are ranked based on test scores available in that period (WRCT and ITBS) rather
than WKCE.
6.3 Competitive Eect{Presence of Voucher Schools
The second concern is whether the competition, at least in the second phase, was eective. As described
earlier, a non-negligible proportion of the school population (at least in the more treated ones) were
34 Controls schools are the same as earlier.
27eligible for vouchers. However, the threat of loss of students to the voucher program would not be
functional unless there was a strong private school presence. More specically, even schools that had a
major proportion of their students eligible for vouchers (example, the more treated schools), would not
be induced to improve if there were not enough voucher schools in close proximity to absorb them.
To investigate this issue, I examine the distribution of voucher schools in Milwaukee and their
distances from public schools.35 An average Milwaukee school in 2004 had 5.66 choice schools within
a one mile radius and 17.23 schools within a 2 mile radius; the corresponding numbers for the more
treated schools were respectively 8.13 and 25. Table 3 shows the distribution of voucher schools around
Milwaukee schools. 27% of the public schools had at least 1-2 voucher schools within a one mile radius,
more than 19% had 3-5, 30% had 6-10 and 13% had more than 11 voucher schools within a one-mile
radius. The presence of voucher schools around the more treated schools was even stronger. 23% of
the more treated schools had 3-5 choice schools within a one mile radius, 48% had 6-10 and 26% had
more than 10. As table 3 shows, this picture is mirrored in the distribution of choice schools within
2 and 3 mile radii of an average Milwaukee school and an average more treated school. Thus there is
strong evidence of considerable public school presence, more so in the vicinity of more treated schools.
This conrms that the more treated schools were the ones who faced the strongest competition from
the program. Not only were a higher proportion of their students eligible for vouchers, but there were
also a larger number of choice schools surrounding them.
6.4 Competitive Eect, Intensity of Treatment and Loss of Voucher Students
I also check whether a higher proportion of student eligibility is associated with a corresponding higher
loss of voucher students from more treated schools. Table 4 shows the distribution of students lost due
to vouchers from more treated, somewhat treated and less treated schools. For ease of comparison, I
have normalized the numbers in each year in terms of the students lost by the less treated schools in
that year. In 1999, a typical more treated (somewhat treated) school lost 1.43 (1.37) times the number
of students lost by the corresponding less treated school. In 2000, a more treated school lost more than
35 Public and voucher school addresses obtained from the Wisconsin DPI are used for the computation of distances.
28twice while a somewhat treated school lost almost 1.5 times the number lost by a typical less treated
school. The picture is similar in 2001 and 2002. The losses have the expected hierarchy in the sense that
the more treated loss always exceeded the somewhat treated loss and the somewhat treated loss the
corresponding less treated loss. Moreover in many cases the group losses are statistically dierent from
each other. Therefore, the table corroborates the fact that higher intensity of treatment was associated
with higher loss of voucher students and higher competitive pressure.
6.5 Sorting
Another issue relates to sorting. Vouchers aect public school quality not only through direct public
school response but also through changes in student composition and peer quality brought about by
sorting. All these three factors get reected in the public school scores.36
To consider this issue, the following points may be noted. First, the empirical part of the paper
seeks to test the theoretical prediction that the quality under Milwaukee phase II will exceed that
under Milwaukee phase I (Corollary 1), where quality is a combination of public school eort and peer
quality, so there is a one to one correspondence between the theory and empirics. Second, each of
the regressions control for demographic composition of schools (example, racial and sex compositions
of schools and percentage of students eligible for free or reduced price lunches). However any change
in student composition in terms of unobservable factors may not be controlled for by these variables.
Note that if sorting leads to cream-skimming, this is going to lead to underestimates of the program
eect in each of the two phases, especially in the second phase where the loss of students was higher.
Therefore inability to adequately account for sorting in this case would only lead to an underestimate
of the dierential second phase eect (as compared to the rst phase).
Finally, to investigate this issue, I examine whether the demographic composition of the dierent
Milwaukee treated groups changed over the years. I run the same three specications as above except
that the dependent variable of school scores is replaced by the respective demographic variable (% black,
% hispanic etc.). I do not nd much evidence of changes in demographic compositions of schools, either
36 See Hsieh and Urquiola (2003) for a discussion.
29in phase I or in phase II (table 6). Only a few of the coecients are statistically signicant and they
are always very small. In phase I, the coecients suggest trend shifts of less than 1% while in phase




Table 7 compares the pre-program trends of the more treated, somewhat treated and less treated schools
with that of the control schools in reading, math, and writing. The odd-numbered columns present OLS
estimates with standard errors that allow for correlations within districts. The even-numbered columns
present xed-eects estimates. The table shows no statistically signicant evidence of any dierence in
pre-program trend between the dierent groups.
Using the 66-47 sample, table 8 analyzes the eect of the Milwaukee voucher program in phase
I on WRCT (% above and % below) scores and ITBS reading, math and language arts scores. For
each set, the rst column reports results from the linear model and the second from the non-linear
model. All results reported are from regressions that include school xed eects. Results from OLS
regressions as well as specication (2) are similar and hence skipped. (They are available on request.)
For WRCT (both % above and % below), the columns (2) and (4) show positive and statistically
signicant eects in the second and fourth years after program. Moreover, they have the right hierarchy
in that the more treated eects exceed the corresponding somewhat treated eects and the somewhat
treated eects the corresponding less treated eects, though they are not statistically dierent between
groups.37 Although many of the other eects are positive (both in linear and non-linear specications),
they are not signicant and do not always have the right hierarchy between groups.
The results for ITBS reading show no evidence of any statistically signicant eect of the program
on any of the treated groups and the eects do not always have the right hierarchy. However, since many
37 The less treated eects do not add any new insight and hence are skipped for lack of space. They are available on
request.
30of the eects are positive and non-negligible in magnitude, I also conduct an F-test of joint signicance
of the more treated eects. They are never statistically signicant for ITBS reading. (Note that the
more treated eects are jointly signicant for WRCT (% above) and in the non-linear specication for
WRCT (% below).) The picture for ITBS math is broadly similar, except that the second year eect of
the somewhat treated group is positive and signicant, although the corresponding more treated eect is
smaller. In language arts, both the linear and non-linear models show a deterioration immediately after
the program which is statistically signicant in the case of the more treated schools. This deterioration
is however temporary, and is reversed in the second year after program. Once again, the somewhat
treated eects, exceed the more treated eects economically, though never statistically.38 The F-test
for joint signicance of the more treated eects show no evidence of any eect for ITBS math and
a deterioration in ITBS language arts. Figure 1 graphs the OLS estimates for ITBS from the linear
model. As expected there is no evidence of any program eect in reading and math and a deterioration
in language arts in its rst year.
Table 9 considers a continuous treatment variable and proxies the intensity of treatment by the
pre-program (1990) percentage of free or reduced price lunch eligible students of schools. The rst
column of each set presents estimates from the linear specication while the second from the non-linear
specication. Although once again the second and fourth year eects in WRCT (both % above and %
below) provide some evidence of improvement economically, they are no longer statistically signicant.
Moreover, there is no evidence of any eect in ITBS reading or math, although once again there is some
evidence of deterioration in language arts in its rst year. Moreover, in neither of the regressions are
the treatment eects jointly signicant (except in language arts). As discussed in the empirical strategy
section, this assumes the program eect to vary linearly with treatment intensity. Therefore, I also run
regressions that allow the program eect to vary non-linearly with treatment intensity (see section 6.1).
Since these results are qualitatively similar to those above, they are not reported here.
38 Since the ITBS was administered in Milwaukee as a district assessment program, I do not have data on non-Milwaukee
Wisconsin schools for this test. (Although some other districts in Wisconsin also administered the ITBS, they often used
other forms of the test. The modes of reporting scores were also dierent between dierent districts and hence not
comparable.) As a result, my comparison group for the ITBS is the less treated group of schools. Since the comparison
group is also treated to some extent, I expect my estimates for the ITBS to be underestimates.
31The ndings for phase I can be summarized as follows: The results are mixed. Most of the coecients
are positive,|however they do not always have the right hierarchy and are often not statistically dierent
from zero. There is some evidence of a positive eect in the second and fourth years after program in
WRCT, at least in the treatment group analysis. There is no evidence of any eect in ITBS reading,
math and language arts (except for some evidence of an initial deterioration in language arts.) These
results seem to be robust in that they are replicated in the analysis with other samples for each of the
above tests.39 However, the eects for the dierent treated groups are never statistically dierent from
each other,|not even for the WRCT second and fourth year estimates.
Milwaukee Phase II
Investigation of pre-reform trends using WKCE data for 1997 and 1998 reveals that there is no
dierential trend in reading, language arts and science between the dierent groups of schools. However,
the more treated schools exhibit a positive signicant dierential trend in comparison to the control
group of schools in both math and social studies. (These results are not reported for lack of space but
are available on request.) Using the 66-47 sample, table 11 analyzes the eect of the Milwaukee voucher
program on WKCE reading, language arts, math, science and social studies scores in the second phase
of the program. For each set, the rst column presents results from the linear model and the second
from the non-linear model. Whenever there are dierences in pre-program trends, the results reported
control for these dierences.40
The results for reading and language arts are similar. Estimation of the linear model shows positive
intercept and trend shifts in most cases, although they are not always statistically signicant. The
nonlinear model estimations (columns (2) and (4)) yield positive year eects which are statistically
signicant in most cases. Moreover, the eects (both in the linear and non-linear specications) almost
always have the right hierarchy and are often statistically dierent between groups.
In math, science and social studies, although the eects from the linear model are in most cases
positive, they are often not statistically signicant and do not have the expected hierarchy. The estimates
39 The results for some other samples for WRCT are illustrated in appendix table A.1.
40 For each of the subject areas, I have estimated regressions that control for pre-program trends as well as those that
do not. The results are qualitatively similar under both formulations.
32from the non-linear model in math and social studies (columns (6) and (9)) are positive and statistically
signicant in most cases. However, the eects often do not have the right hierarchy. The results from
the nonlinear model in science show positive and signicant eects, at least for the somewhat treated
and more treated eects. However, the more treated eect is larger than the somewhat treated eect
only in the last year after program, though the eects are not statistically dierent from each other.
Figure 3 graphs the OLS estimates from the linear model for reading, language arts and math. A
vertical line is drawn at 1998 to characterize the program shift. Consistent with the results above,
they show considerable improvement in reading and language arts after 1998. The more treated group
showed the largest improvement (followed by the somewhat treated group) and the gaps between the
more treated trend line/time path and those of the other groups have narrowed. In math, as seen in
the regression results above, somewhat treated group seems to have improved to a greater extent than
the more treated group.
The results are quite robust in that for each subject area, the same set of ndings hold for dierent
samples,41 dierent specications and both OLS and FE estimates for each specication. These ndings
can be summarized as follows. In both reading and language arts, there is considerable evidence of
improvement in phase II of the program. Moreover, the more treated eects exceed the somewhat
treated eects and the somewhat treated eects exceed the corresponding less treated eects in most
cases.42 In WKCE science, the initial improvement of the somewhat treated group exceeds that of the
more treated group, however over the years the more treated group has improved at a higher rate than
the somewhat treated group, so much so that the fourth year eect surpasses the corresponding eect
for the somewhat treated group. In math and social studies, on the other hand, although most of the
eects are positive and often signicant, they do not often have the expected hierarchy.
41 The results for WKCE reading, language arts, math and social studies for other samples such as 60-47, 66, 60 etc.
are very similar to those described above. Results for some of the subject areas for these samples are reported in appendix
table A.1.
42 Interestingly, the eects are considerably larger in the second, third and fourth years after program than in the rst
year. It may be remembered in this context that the rst year eect will be solely due to the expansion of the program to
include religious schools, whereas the next three years would capture the eect of both this expansion as well as an increase
in the monetary loss from vouchers. However, this does not imply that the latter policy is more eective than the former
because most programs take time to generate desired eects and it is often easier to respond gradually to a program.
33Table 10 considers a continuous treatment variable and proxies the intensity of treatment by the
pre-program (1990) percentage of free or reduced-price lunch eligible students of schools. It investi-
gates whether an increase in treatment intensity is associated with an improvement in WKCE reading,
language arts, math, science and social studies scores. The rst column of each set ts a completely lin-
ear model|after controlling for post-program common intercept and trend shifts and any pre-program
dierence in trend, it investigates whether an increase in treatment intensity is associated with an in-
tercept and/or a trend shift. The second column of each set ts a nonlinear model. After controlling
for any pre-program dierence in year eects and common post-program shocks (using year dummies),
it investigates whether an increase in treatment intensity is associated with an improvement in the rst,
second, third and fourth years after program. There is considerable evidence of improvement in reading
and language arts, at least in the second, third and fourth years after program. There is statistically
signicant evidence of improvement in science in the second year after program,|the other year eects
for science are also positive, although they are not signicant. In math and social studies, many of the
eects are positive, although they are not statistically signicant. Thus the results from this table are
consistent with those obtained in table 11.
Consistent with the above ndings, there is quite some anecdotal evidence that suggests that schools
in Milwaukee have responded to the program in the second phase.43 In 1995, MPS had one school with
before and after-school program. In 2000, there were eighty two such programs. Two MPS schools had
health clinics in 1995, in 2000 the number was forty seven. A contract settled between the MPS and the
Milwaukee Teachers' Education Association (MTEA) allowed the public schools to hire teachers on the
basis of merit, rather than seniority. Traditionally, teachers were hired on the basis of seniority only. A
teacher-evaluation system was established that had union members weeding out bad teachers.44
Finally, it might be useful to compare the results obtained above for the treatment group analysis
with the corresponding eects in Hoxby. In Hoxby (2003b)45, the average annual eect of being most
43 There is not much anecdotal evidence of improvement in the rst phase. Howard Fuller, the superintendent of
Milwaukee Public Schools during 1991-95, writes: \...during its (MPCP's) early years, I observed only a limited impact
on the MPS."
44 See Hess (2002) and the introduction by Howard Fuller in Carol Innerst (2000).
45 I consider Hoxby (2003b) because similar to my phase II analysis, the post-reform period considered by the study is
34treated on WKCE language, math and science NPR scores respectively are 7.959, 8.062 and 13.837 re-
spectively. Comparison of these results with the corresponding more treated eects in table 11 (columns
(4), (6) and (8) respectively) shows that the eects are qualitatively very similar. The dierences in
the actual magnitudes can be attributed to the following reasons. First, her eects are average annual
eects while this paper considers the eects separately over the years. Second, the control group of
schools here is somewhat dierent from Hoxby (see section 6.1.1). Third, the regressions here control
for demographic characteristics and real per pupil expenditure, unlike the relevant regressions in Hoxby.
(Hoxby reports separate regressions that check for the fact that the improvement is not due to increases
in per pupil spending. In these regressions, productivity is dened as NPR scores per thousand dollars
of per pupil spending. She nds that productivity in language, math and science rose by 0.902, 0.973
and 1.660 NPR points per thousand dollars in the more treated schools, after the reform. These results
are not directly comparable to mine.)
Milwaukee Phase I Versus Phase II
Table 12 compares the eect of the voucher program in Milwaukee phases I and II using both
treatment group analysis (Panel A) and continuous treatment variable analysis (panel B). The estimates
here are based on non-linear model estimates in tables 8-11 and all gures are expressed in terms of
the respective sample standard deviations. (The results from the other models are similar and hence
are not reported here.) Columns (1)-(4) report the comparison results in reading, columns (5)-(6) in
language arts and columns (7)-(8) in math.
First, consider panel A. In phase I reading, both for WRCT (% above) and WRCT (% below) scores,
there is statistically signicant evidence of improvement in the second and fourth years after program.
In ITBS, although the eects are positive, they are never statistically dierent from zero. In phase II,
on the other hand, there is positive signicant evidence of improvement in WKCE reading in each of
the second, third and fourth years after program|and each of the Milwaukee phase II eects exceed
the corresponding phase I eects for both WRCT and ITBS. In language arts, there is no evidence of
1998-2002. I consider the results for her more treated group only, because her somewhat treated group does not directly
correspond to any of my treatment groups in the 66-47 sample.
35improvement in phase I. On the other hand, there is positive, signicant and large eects in phase II
each of which exceed the corresponding phase I eect. In math, the Milwaukee phase I eects are never
signicant and are often negative. On the other hand, the phase II eects are positive, statistically
dierent from zero in the second, third and fourth years after program|and each of the phase II eects
exceed the corresponding phase I eect. However, it should be noted here, that as seen earlier the
eects in math do not have the right hierarchy, the somewhat treated eects in each of the years exceed
economically (though, not statistically) the corresponding more treated eects.46
The comparison results in Panel B are very similar.47 Once again the phase II eects in reading,
math and language arts exceed the corresponding phase I eects in each of the years (except rst year
ITBS reading, which however is not statistically signicant.) To summarize, it can be said that the
improvement of the more treated schools in Milwaukee phase II has been considerably larger than those
in Milwaukee phase I, at least for reading and language arts, and there is no evidence to the contrary in
math.48 This nding is quite robust since it holds for all the dierent samples, dierent specications
and dierent tests. These ndings support the prediction obtained from theory.
Mean Reversion
As discussed earlier, a potential concern here is that the improvement of the more treated group can,
to some extent, be caused by mean reversion. Note that this concern pertains only to the treatment
group analysis and not to the continuous variable analysis. Using data for 1997 and 1998, table 13
presents the mean reversion eect estimates. Panel A uses method 1 while panel B uses method 2.
There is no evidence of any mean reversion in reading, language arts or science. Both \low" and \mid"
46 These ndings hold for each of the other samples 60-47, 66 and 60. (This can be checked for reading using appendix
table A.1. The results from ITBS for samples 60-47, 66 and 60 are not reported here to save space. They are available on
request.)
47 The only dierence is that the phase II eects in math and phase I second and fourth year reading eects are no
longer statistically signicant.
48 Since many of the coecients in Milwaukee phase I are not signicant though positive (or negative for WRCT (%
below)), I also do a pair-wise non parametric test (sign test) for each of panel A and panel B eects, where I ignore the
signicance of coecients and consider only their signs. Under the null of equal eects the probability that any one eect
size in Milwaukee phase II exceeds the corresponding one in Milwaukee phase I is
1
2. In each of panel A and panel B, I
have 17 pair-wise comparisons. Under the null, D =(Milwaukee phase II eect-Milwaukee phase I eect) follows a binomial
(17;0:5) distribution. D is positive in all 17 cases in panel A and 16 cases in panel B. The probability of getting 17 (16)
positive D under the null is (0:5)
17 ((0:5)
16). Since this is very small, the null of equal eects can be comfortably rejected.
36groups show comparable amounts of mean reversion in math and only \low" group shows mean reversion
in social studies in the xed eects estimate. The mean reversion results for method 2 are presented in
panel B. The results are very similar except that the \low" group also shows mean reversion in science
in addition to math and social studies.49
Table 14 compares the impact of the Milwaukee voucher program in phase I and phase II after
correcting for mean reversion. The phase II eect sizes are obtained by subtracting the eect size
attributed to mean reversion (obtained from expressing the relevant coecients in table 13, in terms
of standard deviations) from the more treated eect sizes (reported in table 12 panel A) in each of the
four years after program. The phase I eect sizes are the same as in table 12 panel A (see footnote
49). Table 14 Panel A reports mean reversion corrected estimates obtained using method 1 while panel
B reports those obtained using method 2. In both panels, the eect sizes for phase II reading and
language arts remain the same as earlier. In math, although the eect sizes fall, they are still positive
and considerably larger than those in Milwaukee phase I. These results strengthen my earlier ndings
and further conrm the validity of the theoretical prediction.
7.1 Some other Issues
Charter Schools
Milwaukee has seen a recent spurt in the growth of charter schools. Therefore a natural concern is
whether the program eect, especially in phase II, is contaminated by a competitive eect from charters.
Charter schools have been allowed to enter in Milwaukee from the 1993-94 school year. Upto 1998, the
only chartering agency in Milwaukee was the MPS and this resulted in only one charter school. This slow
growth of charters led the Wisconsin State Legislature to authorize three other chartering agencies|
the city of Milwaukee, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the Milwaukee Area Technical College
(MATC). Starting from 1998-99, they could also grant charters in addition to the MPS. Although the
growth of charter schools was initially slow even after 1998 (3 schools and 186 students in 1998-99, 5
49 It may be noted here that using this strategy and the two alternative methods, I nd no evidence of mean reversion
in the period just before 1990 (that is, the period just preceding phase I). Hence the results from this analysis are not
reported here.
37schools and 1,239 students in 1999-2000), it picked up in the year 2000-01 with 11 schools enrolling
5,022 students and further to 24 schools and 9,442 students in 2002.
Several points may be noted in this context. First, the charter schools were not a major factor
in the rst two years of the second phase (1999 and 2000), yet there was considerable improvement
of the treated schools. If charter competition was the driving force, there should not have been an
improvement in 1999 and 2000. Second, the charter schools became more prominent in school year 2000-
2001, however there is no evidence of any shift in the program eect in 2001 which casts further doubt
that the program eects are contaminated by a charter eect. Third, the results remain very similar
after dropping 2001 and 2002. Fourth, since charters were open to all students and were not restricted
to low income students only, the more treated schools in Milwaukee were not dierentially aected by
the program. Rather charter competition was a common eect that was faced by all Milwaukee schools.
This is further supported by the fact that the distribution of charters around more treated schools were
similar to those of an average Milwaukee school. An average Milwaukee school has 2.45 charter schools
within a one-mile radius in 2004 while a more treated school had 2.70 schools and the dierence is not
statistically signicant. Since the continuous treatment variable analysis uses only the Milwaukee public
schools, the charter eect would be absorbed in the common year eect in this analysis. Also note that
the inclusion of year by Milwaukee dummy interactions in the non-linear regressions for treatment group
analysis do not change results qualitatively.
PAVE and Chapter 220 Programs
Two other choice programs in Milwaukee are worth mentioning and it is important to rule them
out as explanations for the pattern of results obtained. Chapter 220 Program, established in 1978 and
further expanded in 1987, caters to the goal of metropolitan integration. It allows minority students
from the MPS to attend public schools in the twenty four suburban districts, while white students
from the suburbs may enroll in the MPS. The voucher program eects in Milwaukee are not likely to
be contaminated by this program since this program started much before the MPCP,|controlling for
dierences in pre-program trends between treatment and control schools gets rid of any eect of the
38Chapter 220 program, more so because the size of the latter program was relatively stable upto the
late 1990s. After that, it actually shrank in size. Thus the chapter 220 program is not likely to lead to
overestimates of the voucher eect in either phase I or phase II.
The PAVE (Partners Advancing Values in Education) program was established in 1992 and it came
into operation from the 1992-93 school year. This is a privately funded school choice program that allows
students at or below 185% (revised to 175% in 1995-96) of the poverty line in the city of Milwaukee
(not just the MPS) to attend any private school in Milwaukee. Unlike the MPCP, PAVE covers only
one-half of the private school tuition requiring the parents to match the other half. Although the
initial participation in PAVE was not negligible, it petered out after the expansion of the Milwaukee
program in 1998 and currently stands at approximately 700 students per year. Also, the proportion
of students transferring from the MPS is small, always constituting less than one-third of the total
PAVE population, so that the number of students leaving the MPS under PAVE has always been much
smaller than under MPCP (even in the rst phase). Moreover since PAVE required the scholarship to
be topped up, overwhelmingly white and more advantaged households participated in the PAVE and the
demographic composition of the PAVE students diered substantially from that of the MPCP students.
The more-treated schools in this paper are predominantly black and hence are not likely to be strongly
aected by PAVE. Further, there is no evidence of any trend shift in scores of the dierent treatment
groups in 1992-93, the rst year after PAVE. Finally, if anything PAVE will lead to overestimates of
the rst phase eect, but not the second phase when students leaving the MPS due to PAVE was very
small. This would indicate even larger (rather than smaller) improvement dierences between the rst
and second phases than that indicated in the paper.
Accountability System
Wisconsin had an accountability system in place from 1997-98. However, the rules of the account-
ability system were symmetric for all schools, so that all schools were similarly aected. Therefore, any
eect of the accountability system would be absorbed by the year dummies in the non-linear specica-
tion and the common intercept and trend shifts in the linear model. Thus, this factor is unlikely to bias
39the program eect.
8 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the role of vouchers as instruments of public school reform. It presents strong
evidence that voucher design matters. It shows both theoretically and empirically that judicious choice
of some of the underlying policy parameters in a simple means-tested voucher program can go a long
way in inducing public school improvement.
The growth of the Milwaukee voucher program in its initial years was severely limited by the lack of
availability of adequate number of private school seats. The number of choice applicants exceeded by far
the capacity of the private schools participating in the parental choice program. The second phase saw
a major increase in the number of private school seats when following a Wisconsin Supreme court ruling
religious schools were allowed to participate for the rst time in the 1998-99 school year. The second
phase was also characterized by a discontinuous rise in the revenue loss per student from vouchers due
to some changes in the funding formula. In the context of an equilibrium theory of public school and
household behavior, the study predicts that these factors would lead to an unambiguous improvement
in public school performance. Using a dierence-in-dierences analysis in trends and Wisconsin data
from 1987 through 2002, it then shows that this prediction is validated empirically. The paper thus
provides an important lesson|any voucher program may not have a positive eect on public school
incentives and performance. However, careful choice of parameters can go a long way to induce public
school improvement. The ndings of the paper undoubtedly have important implications for public
school reform, more so in the context of the present concern over public school performance.
This paper considers public school test scores as the only outcome variable. An interesting di-
rection of future research would be to analyze the impact of such policy changes on other outcome
variables|such as absentee rate, retention rate, dropout rate, teacher quality etc. Presumably increase
in competition (through changes in parameters such as above) would induce public schools to make
themselves more attractive to their potential customers and to cater to the amenities that their cus-
40tomers care for. This relates to the deeper question of the household preference function and what
households value most in public schools.
Technical Appendix: Proofs of Results and Claims
Claim 1: A household equilibrium always exists.
The existence can be proved in the following steps:
(i) Dene  : [0;1] ! [0;1] such that for all b0 2 [0;1],



















































(ii) ^ (y;b0;:) is continuous in b0 (from 3.1.1a). F(^ ) is continuous in ^  (as both numerator and
denominator are continuous in ^  and 0 < ^  < 1 ensures that the denominator is non-zero). Therefore
 is a continuous function from [0;1] ! [0;1].
(iii) Since [0;1] is non-empty, compact and convex and  is continuous, there exists at least one xed
point b = (b) by Brouwer's xed point theorem.
Claim 2: The equilibrium number of public school students increases with public school eort and
decreases with vouchers.
Proof:
Step 1: Equilibrium peer group quality falls with vouchers and increases with public school eort.
At the household equilibrium,
b = g(b;e;v;t;c;yT;) where b denotes the equilibrium peer quality under targeted vouchers.
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, which is negative.
Consider
R 1
0 ^ dy   b = yT[^ 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N(:) , for each y.
R 1
0 ^ dy   b is positive if  is not very small. Henceforth, I
assume  is not very small|in Milwaukee, its value was quite large (on average, 0.78 during 1991-95).
Then
R 1
0 ^ dy   b > 0. Therefore,
Z 1
0
^ (:)dy   b > 0 ) yT ^ (v;:) + (1   yT)^ (0;:)   b > 0 ) yT[^ (v;:)   b] + (1   yT)[^ (0;:)   b] > 0
) (1   yT)[^ (0;:)   b] > jyT[^ (v;:)   b]j ) (1   yT)[^ (0;:)   b] >  jyT[^ (v;:)   b]j;since 1 >  > 0
This implies:






























Therefore, it follows that
g(b;:)
e > 0.
























Starting from a status quo position of v = 0 consider a marginal increase in v targeted to low income























2 , ^ (0) > b(0). It follows that
g(b;0;:)
v < 0.
Step 2: Equilibrium cuto ability at each income level increases with eort and decreases with
vouchers.















Using step 1 and the signs of the partial derivatives of ^  from 3.1.1, it follows that
^ (y;b;:)
e > 0 and
^ (y;b;:)
v < 0.
Step 3: Noting that N(e;v;b;:) = yT ^ (e;v;b;:) + (1   )yT ^ 0 + (1   yT)^ (e;0;b;:), the proof
follows from step 2.
Claim 3: At the household equilibrium under the voucher system, (i) the number of public school
students decreases with an increase in  and (ii) the marginal number of students that the public
school can gain with an increase in eort increases with .
Proof: The proof follows since




Proof of Proposition 1. Under the voucher program, eV solves the rst order condition:
RV (e;v)
e = (l   cN(:))Ne(e;v)   Ce(e) = 0. Since Ne(:) > 0 and Ce(:) > 0, l   cN(:) > 0 at equilibrium.




 [(l   cN)Nev   cNNNvNe]
(l   cN)Nee   cNNN2
e   Cee
A:1
The denominator is negative from the strict concavity of the rent function. Therefore eort increases
or decreases under the voucher equilibrium i [(l  cN)Nev  cNNNvNe] > 0. From the strict convexity















v < 0 from lemma 1. It can be easily seen that
2^ (y;b;:)
eb < 0 and
2^ (y;b;:)
ev < 0. Therefore although
the rst term is negative, the second is positive and Nev ? 0. Therefore A.1 ? 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.
43Proof to part (i):
The rent function under the voucher system is given by:
RV = (p   l)N0 + lN(e;v;;:)   c1   c(N(e;v;;:))   C(e)
The corresponding rst order condition is given by:
[l   cN(e;v;;:)]Ne(e;v;;:)   Ce(e) = 0




[l   cN(:)]Ne(:)   cNN(:)N(:)Ne(:)
[l   cN(:)]Nee(:)   cNN(:)N2
e(:)   Cee(:)
The denominator is negative from strict concavity of the rent function. From claim 3 and the
convexity of the cost function it follows that e
 > 0.
Proof to part (ii):





[l   cN(:)]Nee(:)   cNN(:)N2
e(:)   Cee(:)
which is positive.
It follows that eV;II > eV;I.
Proof of corollary 1. Suppose phase II is characterized by both a higher  and a higher l, that is










= [l2   cN(N(eV;I;2;:))]Ne(eV;I;2;:)   [l1   cN(N(eV;I;1;:))]Ne(eV;I;1;:)
Since N < 0, cN(N(eV;I;2;:)) < cN(N(eV;I;1;:)). Therefore, l2 > l1 imply
[l2   cN(N(eV;I;2;:))] > [l1   cN(N(eV;I;1;:))]. Moreover claim 3 implies
Ne(eV;I;2;:) > Ne(eV;I;1;:). It follows that eV;II > eV;I.
44Denoting the change in the proportion , equilibrium quality and equilibrium eort from phase I to






d]. The rst term in
the right hand side is positive and represents the increase in quality in phase II due to an increase in
eort. The second term (
q
b(b
ede)) is positive|an increase in eort increases peer quality which in
turn increases quality in phase II in comparison to the rst phase. The last term is negative. An
increase in the proportion  decreases peer quality which in turn decreases quality. However the last
term is small and is more than oset by the rst two positive terms, so that quality increases in the
second phase. The intuition behind the last term is as follows. Peer quality in the MPS in a voucher
regime can be thought of as a weighted average of the average abilities of two groups|the group that
choose to remain in the MPS even in spite of vouchers and the group that is forced to return to the
MPS because they are unsuccessful in getting a seat at a voucher private school. An increase in  does
not aect the average ability of the rst group. It also does not aect the average ability of the second
group|this is because the students coming back represent a random sample of those that want to go
and their average ability will always equal the average ability of the group that want to leave with
vouchers irrespective of what the proportion  is. However the weightage of the two groups changes
and an increase in  decreases the weightage of the second group. Since the second group has a higher
average ability, an increase in  decreases the MPS peer quality. In terms of the Milwaukee voucher
program, the weight of the second group is substantially smaller than that of the rst group and the
fall in weightage has been very small (around 0.04). Therefore quality should be expected to increase
in the second phase as compared to the rst.
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47Table 1: Milwaukee Parental Choice Program Participation
School year
1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95
Number of Students allowed by Statute 931 946 950 968 1,452
Number of Private Nonsectarian Schools in Milwaukee 22 22 23 23 23
Number of private schools participating 7 6 11 12 12
Number of Seats oered in Private Schools 406 561 694 811 982
Number of Students who Applied 577 689 998 1049 1046
Source: Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau Report 95-3 (1995).Table 2: Milwaukee Parental Choice Program: Membership and Payment History
Funding of the MPCP Amount
MPS All other Districts
Year Number
 Aid
 MPS Voucher MPCP Amount Reduction % of Reduction % of Each
of Schools Members Enrollment (Millions) (Millions) Aid (Millions) District's Aid
1990-91 7 300 $2446 $0.7 $0.7 0.3 $0.0 0.0
1991-92 6 512 93,381 2643 1.4 1.4 0.5 0.0 0.0
1992-93 11 594 94,258 2745 1.6 1.6 0.6 0.0 0.0
1993-94 12 704 95,258 2985 2.1 2.1 0.7 0.0 0.0
1994-95 12 771 98,009 3209 2.5 2.5 0.8 0.0 0.0
1995-96 17 1288 98,378 3667 4.6 4.6 1.2 0.0 0.0
1996-97 20 1616 101,007 4373 7.1 7.1 1.6 0.0 0.0
1997-98 23 1497 101,253 4696 7.0 7.0 1.5 0.0 0.0
1998-99 83 5761 99,814 4894 28.7 28.7 5.6 0.0 0.0
1999-00 90 7575 99,729 5106 39.1 19.5 3.4 19.5 0.6
2000-01 100 9238 97,985 5326 49.0 24.5 4.1 24.5 0.7
2001-02 102 10497 97,762 5553 59.4 26.7 4.4 0.0 0.0
2002-03 102 11350 97,293 5783 65.6 29.5 4.7 0.0 0.0
 Represents the number of choice schools.
Aid membership is calculated as the average of September and January FTE, plus summer school.
Sources: Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau Informational Paper 29 (2003) and Wisconsin Department of Public
Instruction.Table 3: Distribution of Private Schools within 1, 2, 3 Mile Radii of Public Schools
Number of Private Schools Within 1 Mile Radius
0 1-2 3-5 6-10 11-15 >15
% of Public Schools 10.68 27.18 19.42 30.1 11.65 0.97
% of More Treated Public Schools 3.22 0 22.58 48.38 22.58 3.22
Number of Private Schools Within 2 Mile Radius
0 1-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 >30
% of Public Schools 0.97 17.48 12.62 31.07 25.24 12.62
% of More Treated Public Schools 0 3.22 0 25.81 45.16 25.81
Number of Private Schools Within 3 Mile Radius
0 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 >40
% of Public Schools 0 14.56 14.56 16.5 17.48 36.89
% of More Treated Public Schools 0 0 3.23 6.45 22.58 67.42
Table 4: Distribution of Students Lost due to Vouchers, 1999-2002
More Treated, Somewhat Treated and Less Treated Schools
Loss of Voucher Students
(Normalization: Less Treated=1.00)
1999 2000 2001 2002
More Treated 1.43 2.09 1.71 1.51
Somewhat Treated 1.37 1.45 1.35 1.27
Less Treated 1.00y 1.00yyy 1.00yyy 1.00yyy
, , : more treated signicantly dierent from somewhat treated at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,
respectively. y,yy,yyy: more treated signicantly dierent from less treated at 10, 5 and 1 percent level
respectively.Table 5: Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
Choice Students, by Grade, All Schools (School Year 1994-95)
Grade Level Number of % of Grade Level Number of % of
Students Total Students Students Total Students
Kindergarten (4-year olds) 73 8.8% 7th 45 5.4%
Kindergarten (5-year olds) 120 14.4 8th 41 4.9
1st 148 17.8 9th 29 3.5
2nd 85 10.2 10th 23 2.8
3rd 81 9.8 11th 8 1.0
4th 71 8.6 12th 9 1.1
5th 53 6.4 Total 830 100
6th 44 5.3
Source: Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau Report 95-3 (1995).
Table 6: Eect of the Milwaukee Program on the Demographic Composition of Schools
Phase I Phase II
% black % hispanic % white % black % hispanic % white
Less treated*program 0.90 0.40 -1.26 1.58 -0.97 -0.84
(1.59) (0.83) (1.38) (1.97) (2.17) (1.25)
Somewhat treated*prog -0.25 1.06 -1.24 1.80 0.30 -2.38
(1.35) (0.63) (1.16) (1.04) (0.80) (0.89)
More treated*program -1.0 1.57 -1.24 0.42 0.28 -0.42
(1.34) (0.81) (1.09) (0.90) (0.72) (0.75)
Less treated*program 0.22 0.16 -0.69 -1.46 0.43 0.89
*trend (0.32) (0.15) (0.27) (0.90) (1.12) (0.51)
Somewhat treated*program 0.70 -0.12 -0.89 -1.21 -0.02 1.06
*trend (0.25) (0.13) (0.20) (0.39) (0.32) (0.32)
More treated*program 0.08 -0.39 0.61 -0.29 -0.80 1.38
*trend (0.23) (0.14) (0.19) (0.33) (0.27) (0.25)
Observations 1228 1226 1228 771 771 771
R-squared 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.98
, , : signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. This table uses the 66-47 sample. Huber-
White standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions include school xed eects, time trend, program
dummy and program dummy interacted with trend.Table 7: Pre-program trend of the dierent treated groups (as compared to the control group)
WRCT Grade 3 Reading (1989-90), ITBS Grade 5 Math (1987-90), Reading (1987-90) and Language Arts (1989-90)
WRCT ITBS
% above % below Reading Math Language Arts
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE









(2.33) (2.16) (1.79) (2.08) (4.11) (3.42) (1.66) (0.98) (2.71) (2.66)
More treated * -3.08 -2.03 1.57 0.89 3.01 1.88 0.56 0.32 -2.84 -1.81
trend (3.41) (3.35) (2.71) (3.13) (3.69) (2.73) (1.97) (1.40) (3.72) (3.75)
Somewhat treated * -4.41 -3.61 3.84 2.28 3.14 2.12 0.73 0.31 -3.96 -4.29
trend (3.01) (2.67) (2.34) (2.44) (4.05) (3.17) (1.83) (1.21) (2.48) (3.71)
Less treated * -2.33 -3.23 -0.29 -1.24
trend (3.61) (3.10) (2.53) (2.71)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 242 242 242 242 411 411 410 410 207 207
R-squared 0.50 0.87 0.40 0.83 0.30 0.56 0.30 0.71 0.29 0.83
, , : signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. This table uses the 66-47 sample. Huber-
White standard errors are in parenthesis. OLS regressions include more treated, somewhat treated and less treated
dummies. Fixed eects regressions include school xed eects. Controls include race, sex, percentage of students
eligible for free or reduced price lunch and real per pupil expenditure.Table 8: Eect of Voucher Program on Treatment Status, Milwaukee Phase I
WRCT ITBS
WRCT (% above) (% below) Reading Math Lang. Arts
FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Somewhat treated*program 3.50 -3.72 3.21 0.39 -7.95
(2.59) (1.94) (5.45) (2.81) (5.40)
More treated * program 2.85 -1.60 3.40 -2.97 -12.69
(3.32) (2.56) (5.79) (3.13) (6.33)
Somewhat treated*program 0.64 -0.26 1.22 0.61 6.28
*trend (0.47) (0.34) (2.02) (0.54) (3.62)
More treated*program *trend 0.67 0.14 3.40 0.75 6.79
(0.62) (0.46) (5.79) (0.63) (4.30)
Somewhat treated * 1 year after 2.03 -0.54 4.15 -1.35 -0.88
(2.81) (2.05) (4.49) (2.94) (2.82)
Somewhat treated * 2 years after 5.38 -4.45 7.83 6.14 5.03
(2.43) (1.88) (5.17) (3.38) (3.64)
Somewhat treated * 3 years after 5.01 -2.60 6.78 2.47
(3.03) (2.30) (5.31) (3.31)
Somewhat treated * 4 years after 9.62 -4.79 2.62
(2.65) (1.79) (2.64)
More treated * 1 year after -0.92 1.55 1.12 -4.02 -7.86
(3.33) (2.50) (3.86) (3.26) (3.24)
More treated * 2 years after 6.06 -4.16 6.59 4.36 0.06
(3.14) (2.50) (5.15) (3.83) (4.12)
More treated * 3 years after 5.69 0.38 2.85 -2.22
(3.16) (3.16) (5.18) (3.54)
More treated * 4 years after 11.02 -4.64 -3.62
(3.34) (2.60) (3.13)
Observations 1195 1195 1195 1195 717 717 1127 1127 409 409
R-squared 0.50 0.58 0.47 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.60 0.70 0.70
p-value1 0.06 0.02 0.82 0.07 0.68 0.62 0.49 0.28 0.04 0.04
, , : signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 1 p-value of the F-test of joint signicance of more treated shift coecicents.
Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. This table uses the 66-47 sample. Columns (1), (3), (7), (9) include a time trend, program
dummy, program dummy interacted with trend, while columns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10) include year dummies. All regressions include school xed
eects, race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free and reduced price lunches and real per pupil expenditure and are weighted by the
number of students tested.Table 9: Eect of Voucher Program in Phase I using a continuous treatment variable
(Sample of Milwaukee Public Schools)
WRCT ITBS
% above % below Reading Math Lang Arts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Treatment * Program 0.09 -0.04 0.07 -0.09 -0.20

(0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.11)
Treatment * Program 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00
* trend (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06)
Treatment * 1 year after -0.09 0.03 0.03 -0.11 -0.17

(0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Treatment * 2 years after 0.07 -0.05 0.06 0.00 -0.10
(0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Treatment * 3 years after 0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.13
(0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Treatment * 4 years after 0.14 -0.08 -0.15
(0.10) (0.06) (0.07)
Observations 920 920 920 920 708 708 1119 1220 441 443
R-squared 0.47 0.55 0.44 0.50 0.53 0.54 0.58 0.54 0.68 0.67
p-value
1 0.28 0.13 0.75 0.32 0.74 0.76 0.25 0.13 0.01 0.05
Table 10: Eect of Voucher Program in Phase II using a continuous treatment variable
(Sample of Milwaukee Public Schools)
Dependent Variable: WKCE Scores
Reading Language Arts Math Science Social Studies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Treatment * Program 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Treatment * Program 0.04
 0.03 -0.09 0.01 -0.13
* trend (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.07)
Treatment * 1 year after 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)




(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)
Treatment * 3 years after 0.14
 0.18
 0.10 0.10 0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Treatment * 4 years after 0.14
 0.12
 0.05 0.11 -0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Observations 509 509 509 509 510 510 510 510 510 510
R-squared 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.77 0.78
p-value
1 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.44 0.34 0.26 0.31 0.16 0.99
Notes for tables 10 and 11: , , : signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 1 p-value of the F-test of joint signicance
of shift coecients due to treatment. Treatment instensity is proxied by the percentage of students eligible for free or reduced price lunches.
Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include school xed eects and are weighted by the number of students tested
and control for race, sex and percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches. Odd numbered columns include time trend,
program dummy, interaction of program dummy with trend. Even numbered columns include year dummies. In table 10, columns (5) and (9)
include interactions of trend with treatment (%frl) and columns (6) and (10) include interaction of D1 dummy (D1 = 1 if year > 1997) with
treatment.Table 11: Eect of Voucher Program on Treatment Status, Milwaukee Phase II
(WKCE Grade 4 Reading, Language Arts, Math, Science and Social Studies, 1997-2002)
Reading Language Arts Math Science Soc. Stud.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Less treated * program 2.26 2.92 2.13 1.58
(3.32) (3.32) (3.21) (3.14)
Somewhat treated * program 2.66 5.10 5.73 7.42z
(2.15) (2.14) (2.37) (2.30)
More treated * program 2.35 3.08 3.20 4.63
(2.65) (2.65) (3.09) (2.84)
Less treated * prog*trend -0.46 -0.19 0.44 1.24
(1.07) (1.13) (1.05) (1.09)
Somewhat treated* prog 0.34 0.13 1.17 0.92
* trend (0.66) (0.69) (0.76) (0.79)
More treated * prog*trend 1.33y 1.40z -2.19 1.76
(0.76) (0.82) (2.52) (0.91)
Less treated * 1 year 2.93 4.69 5.18 5.28 4.39
(2.83) (2.63) (2.71) (2.54) (2.54)
Less treated * 2 years -0.15 1.80 1.40 2.95 4.13
(2.52) (2.41) (2.70) (2.43) (2.24)
Less treated * 3 years 1.26 1.59 4.24 4.68 4.31
(2.25) (2.33) (2.56) (2.83) (2.52)
Less treated * 4 years 0.53 2.32 5.07 7.78 5.93
(2.93) (2.98) (2.94) (3.04) (3.09)
Somewhat treated * 1 year 2.66 5.28 8.04 9.07 5.95
(1.86) (1.75) (2.01) (1.87) (1.68)
Somewhat treated * 2 years 4.36zz 7.19zz 8.36zzz 10.25zzz 7.66
(1.99) (2.12) (2.19) (1.88) (1.69)
Somewhat treated * 3 years 3.66 5.30z 9.99zz 10.18zz 7.45
(1.89) (2.02) (2.03) (2.11) (1.94)
Somewhat treated * 4 years 3.55 4.44 9.35 11.02 7.17
(1.94) (1.93) (2.16) (2.25) (2.12)
More treated * 1 year 2.67 4.30 4.08 7.27 3.10
(2.37) (2.27) (2.89) (2.39) (2.61)
More treated * 2 years 6.50yy 8.37yy 5.75 9.46yy 5.21
(2.41) (2.61) (2.86) (2.52) (2.56)
More treated * 3 years 6.89yy 8.84yy 8.62y 8.96 5.04
(2.55) (2.94) (3.02) (2.81) (3.04)
More treated * 4 years 6.48yy 6.89 7.88 12.16 5.50
(2.20) (2.32) (2.86) (2.66) (2.83)
Observations 669 669 669 669 670 670 670 670 670
R-squared 0.79 0.80 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.82
p-value1 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.22
, , : signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. y,yy,yyy: more treated signicantly dierent from less treated at 10, 5 and 1
percent level respectively. +,++,+++: more treated signicantly dierent from somewhat treated at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. z,zz,zzz:
somewhat treated signicantly dierent from less treated at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 1 p-value of the F-test of joint signicance of
more treated shift coecicents. Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. This table uses the 66-47 sample. All regressions include school
xed eects and are weighted by the number of students tested and control for race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free and reduced price
lunches and real per pupil expenditure. Odd numbered columns include time trend, program dummy, interaction of program dummy with trend.
Even numbered columns include year dummies. Column (5) includes interactions of trend with treated dummies and columns (6) and (9) include
interaction of D1 dummy (D1 = 1 if year > 1997) with treated dummies.Table 12: Comparing the impact of the Milwaukee voucher program in Phase I with that in Phase II
Using performance in reading test [WRCT, ITBS and WKCE] and math test [ITBS and WKCE]
Panel A Using Treatment Groups
Reading Language Arts Math
Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II
WRCT ITBS WKCE ITBS WKCE ITBS WKCE
% above % below
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
More Treated * 1 year after prog -0.06 0.14 0.06 0.20 -0.48
 0.33
 -0.24 0.27
















Panel B Using Continuous Treatment Variable
Reading Language Arts Math
Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II
WRCT ITBS WKCE ITBS WKCE ITBS WKCE
% above % below
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
More Treated * 1 year after prog -0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.01
 0.002 -0.006 0.002
More treated * 2 years after prog 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.01
 -0.006 0.01
 0.00 0.005
More treated * 3 years after prog 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.01
 0.01
 -0.008 0.007




All gures are in terms of respective sample standard deviations and pertain to the 66-47 sample. All gures are obtained from regressions that contain
school xed eects, year dummies, interactions of year dummies with more treated, somewhat treated, less treated year dummies respectively, are weighted
by the number of students tested and control for race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced price lunches and real per pupil expenditure.
For the Panel A sample: Standard deviation of WRCT (% above) scores = 16, Standard deviation of WRCT (% below) Scores = 10.98, Standard deviation
of ITBS Reading scores = 18.45, Standard deviation of ITBS Language Arts scores = 16.23, Standard deviation of ITBS Math scores = 16.71, Standard
deviation of WKCE Reading scores = 13.07, Standard deviation of WKCE Language Arts scores = 12.88, Standard deviation of WKCE Math scores =
15.01. For the Panel B sample: Standard deviation of WRCT (% above) scores = 15.81, Standard deviation of WRCT (% below) Scores = 11.56, Standard
deviation of ITBS Reading scores = 18.45, Standard deviation of ITBS Language Arts scores = 16.23, Standard deviation of ITBS Math scores = 16.71,
Standard deviation of WKCE Reading scores = 12.92, Standard deviation of WKCE Language Arts scores = 13.08, Standard deviation of WKCE Math
scores = 14.44.Table 13: Mean Reversion in Wisconsin, 1997-1998.
(Using WKCE Reading, Language Arts, Math, Science and Social Science Scores, 1997-98.)
Panel A Method 1: Based on total score rank
Reading Language Arts Math Science Social Science
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
low*trend -1.34 -0.26 -3.59 -2.14 2.22 3.87
 1.68 3.08 3.62 5.30

(3.47) (2.58) (3.09) (2.02) (3.65) (2.17) (3.24) (2.09) (2.95) (2.13)
mid*trend -2.37 -1.36 -3.52 -3.14 2.19 3.63
 1.90 1.85 0.75 0.44
(2.99) (2.02) (2.68) (1.63) (3.33) (1.86) (3.15) (1.98) (2.51) (1.67)
high*trend -3.74 -2.40 -3.49 -2.80 0.08 0.98 -2.95 -3.79 -2.44 -2.37
(4.02) (2.49) (4.47) (2.63) (5.36) (3.01) (4.30) (2.46) (3.69) (2.31)
Observations 229 229 230 230 229 229 230 230 230 230
R
2 0.53 0.91 0.58 0.93 0.56 0.92 0.64 0.94 0.67 0.93
Panel B Method 2: Based on individual subject score rank
Reading Language Arts Math Science Social Science
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




(3.52) (2.51) (3.14) (2.06) (3.63) (1.87) (3.27) (1.86) (3.03) (2.26)
mid*trend -2.80 -3.06 -3.71 -3.13 1.83 4.23
 -0.10 -0.63 0.77 0.91
(2.91) (1.97) (2.79) (1.85) (3.15) (1.90) (2.88) (1.68) (2.31) (1.56)
high*trend -3.56 -2.54 -6.00 -5.85 1.77 2.07 -3.21 -4.39 -4.20 -2.93
(3.71) (2.73) (4.10) (2.73) (5.39) (3.10) (4.79) (2.45) (4.18) (2.56)
Observations 229 229 229 229 230 230 230 230 230 230
R
2 0.55 0.91 0.53 0.92 0.62 0.93 0.66 0.94 0.68 0.93
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis.
OLS regressions include dummies for low, mid and high groups respectively while xed eects columns include school
xed eects. All regressions are weighted by the number of students tested and include race, sex, free-reduced lunch
and per pupil expenditure as controls. Standard deviation of WKCE Reading scores = 12.86, Standard deviation of
WKCE Language Arts scores = 12.16, Standard deviation of WKCE Math scores = 14.18. Standard deviation of
WKCE Science scores = 13.94, Standard deviation of WKCE Social Studies scores = 12.83.Table 14: Comparing the impact of the Milwaukee voucher program in Phase I with that in Phase II,
after correcting for mean reversion
Panel A Reading Language Arts Math
Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II
WRCT ITBS WKCE ITBS WKCE ITBS WKCE
% above % below
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
More Treated * 1 year after prog -0.06 0.14 0.06 0.20 -0.48
 0.33
 -0.24 0.00
















Panel B Reading Language Arts Math
Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II
WRCT ITBS WKCE ITBS WKCE ITBS WKCE
% above % below
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
More Treated * 1 year after prog -0.06 0.14 0.06 0.20 -0.48
 0.33
 -0.24 0.03
















All gures are in terms of respective sample standard deviations and pertain to the 66-47 sample. For relevant standard deviations, see notes for tables 13
and 14. Mean reversion in panels A and B are respectively based on methods 1 and 2 respectively.Table A.1: Eect of the Voucher program on treatment status, Phase I and Phase II
Checking robustness using dierent samples
(WRCT % above scores, 1989-1997 and WKCE Reading Scores 1997-2002)
WRCT % above WKCE Reading
60-47 66 60 60-47 66 60
FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Less treated * 1 year after program 2.55 2.95
(3.20) (2.83)
Less treated * 2 years after program 2.81 -0.16
(2.67) (2.52)
Less treated * 3 years after program 3.24 1.28
(3.75) (2.25)
Somewhat treated * 1 year after program 0.90 2.64 1.56 2.94 2.66 2.89
(3.02) (2.63) (2.75) (1.93) (1.79) (1.84)






(2.64) (2.25) (2.36) (2.10) (1.89) (1.95)






(3.21) (2.90) (3.01) (2.01) (1.78) (1.84)
More treated * 1 year after program -0.72 -0.90 0.76 2.39 2.72 2.41
(2.93) (3.32) (2.92) (2.14) (2.36) (2.13)







(2.68) (3.12) (2.68) (2.18) (2.41) (2.17)




(3.47) (3.97) (3.46) (2.22) (2.54) (2.22)
Observations 1195 1195 1195 669 669 669
R-squared 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.74 0.79 0.79
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
y,
yy,
yyy: more treated signicantly dierent from less treated at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
+,
++,
+++: more treated signicantly dierent from somewhat treated at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
z,
zz,
zzz: somewhat treated signicantly dierent from less treated at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. All columns include school xed eects, year dummies and control






















































Sample of More treated, Somewhat treated and Control Schools 
Figure 2. Milwaukee Voucher Program, Phase I
ITBS Reading
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Figure 3. Milwaukee Voucher Program, Phase II
WKCE Reading
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